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Preface 
This thesis affords an examination of the operation of the 
Capital Market in New Zealand as it affects local author.lties. 
The intention of the study is to determine and analyse the 
factors affecting the supply of and demand for capital, to 
examine the problems at present faced by the authorities in their 
attempts to obtain capital finance, and to conjecture as to 
whether or not the Market is organised in such a way that best 
ensures an adequate flow of capital to this sector. 
The chronic difficulties experienced by many local authori-
ties in their attempts to obtain capital finance were among the 
factors which induced the New Zealand Government (in 1957) to 
set up a Royal Commission to investigate the whole field of local 
authority finance and the Report of that Commission (presented 
in September 1958) provides the basis for much of this Thesis. 
Other information has been obtained from a series of personal 
interviews which have been scheduled as 'Appendix A'~ 
INTRODUCTION 
THE LIBRARY 
UNIVERSITY OF CANTERBUR1 
CHRISTCHURCH, N.Z. 
A capital market is that series of institutions and practiaes 
which stands between the holders of idle funds on the one hand 
and the potential borrowers of capital on the other. A capital 
market presupposes a supply of capital awaiting investment but 
the mere existence of a supply of investable capital is tn itself 
insufficient as such capital must be made available to the borrower 
in an acceptable form and this is the function of the capital market. 
The effectiveness of the market, then dcepends upon the extent to 
which i.t stimulates savings, makes lending terms attractive, and 
provides a channel through which funds are placed in convenient 
form and upon acceptable terms at the disposal of borrowers. For 
the savers there must be satisfactory methods of setting asi.de 
savtng8 as well as a suf:ficient inducement to save and lend. 
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D.ifferent classes of lenders require different types of investments. 
Some, e. 9. many small savers are mainly concerned with security, 
while others may seek a maximum return and yet at the same time be 
prepared to carry a degree of risk. Yet others are prepared to tie 
up their money for a lengthy period of time in return for a steady 
stable income over that period. The converse applies to the 
borrowers; some may require capital for a short period only, a few 
days maybe only a few hours, or, like some local authorities, they 
may float a loan with a maturity period of forty years. The 
institutions of the market should .be S\lfficiently varied and adaptable 
to meet all requirements. An inefficient market may induce borrowers 
to place an undue emphasis upon the use of bank credit. 
But at the same time the market must be able to give mobility 
to capital e.g •. a Southland farmer must be able to lend to an 
Auckland industrialist should the need arise. If all expansion 
could be financed by the ploughing back of profits .there would be 
no need for a Capital market. At the same time .the market acts as 
a buffer and by reducing the element of risk to the lender it tends 
to .make borrowing cheaper. 
The structure of the market can, in itself, influence the 
volume of finance avaiiabie for investment e.g. the existence of a 
short term money market may mean that many funds which prevtously 
were forced to remain idle through lack of investment opportunity, 
are utilised. The institutions of the market, by bringing together 
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the numerous small savin,gs of individuals into an aggregate that is 
profitable to lend, provide a service to the smaller savers that 
would .not otherwise .exist. 
Up until the present time the ·l'iw Zealand Capital Marke.t has 
been.somewhat undeveloped but the commencement, over the past 
few years 1 of unit trusts, and a short term money .market, together 
with the proposed Industrial Finance Corporation has helped to add a 
degree of sophistication wh.tch was. hitherto absent. 
It is usual to divide the borrowers of capital upon a capital 
market into three separate categories, i.e. the Central Government I 
local authorities, and private borrowers. Each of these separate 
sectors has its own distinguishing characteristics. The Central 
Government is to all .intents and purposes a single borrower and, 
generally speaking, it obtains its finance from a few clearly defined 
sources. It is .usually a long term borrower ~nd i~ is in a position 
to offer the maximum security. The private sector is the most diverse 
in composition. It is made up of innumerable borrowers ranging from 
house property. mortgagors to insurance companies all requiring 
finance for widely different reasons and offering vastly different 
securities~ The local authqrity sector lies somewhere between the 
two but in most respects tends to gravitate towards the Government 
Sector rather than the private. It is nevertheless possessed of 
several individual characteristics which clearly demarcate it from 
the Government Sector. 
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The Structure of Local Government in New Zealand . 
The structure of local government in New Zealand has long 
been a topic of considerable controversy and the diverse nature and 
form of the various authorities has exerted a consid.erable influence 
upon their activities. 9n the market. Som.e authorities are .able to 
obtain finance more readily than others; some need more finance than 
others; some are able to obtain finance more readily from one pqrti-
cular source than others; some lenders prefer one class of authority 
to another while not all authorities can offer the same d~gree of 
security. 
The local authority structur~ at present existing in New. 
Zealand has derived from colonial days, when difficulties of transport 
necessitated the establishment of numerous semi-autonomous pockets 
of population which eventually tended to buUd up their own systems 
. . 
of government. As time. passed vested. interests became established 
.in the existing order and the difficulty has been to break down this 
status quo. A good example of this is the number of small municipa-
lities in the Otago and West Coast Provinces of the South Island 
which, although still retaining borough status, are carrying well 
below. the minimum population required by Statute (The Municipal 
Corporations Act 1954) for a borough. A further example is the large 
number of small harbour boards which have been able to remain in 
existence despite greatly improved rail. and road transport systems 
which would make the use of fewer ports more economic. The number 
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of counties existing in New Zealand is possibly three times greater 
than it should be • .This situation was aggravated by the incompetent 
arrangements which operated for the granting of Government finance 
to counties under the 1876 Counties Act •. At the same time I however 1 
it should be noted that in recent years considerable success , has 
been gained in the amalgamation of counties and their numbers are 
steadily decreasing. 
From time to time various districts have taken it upon them-
selves to provide their distrtct with a major asset and this has 
frequently .induced the establishment of a single authority designed 
specifically to manage that asset. The two most notable of these 
are the Auckland. Harbour Bridge Authority and the Christchurch 
Lyttelton Road Tunnel Authority. 
Differing growth rates and structures and the consequent 
difference arising in rating demand has also been a big factor in 
inhibiting the amalgamation of many municipalities and this tendency 
is especially. noticeable in the Auckland Urban Area where some 
twenty boroughs have defied attempts at amalgamation. Situations 
sometim~ arise where a completely built up town with a stationary or 
even declining population exists either entirely within or adjacent to 
the boundaries of a much larger and more rapidly growing city, two 
very good examples being Petone Borough adjacent to Lower Hutt City 
and Riccarton Borough situated within Christchurch City, In such a 
case the rating level of the smaller town will tend to be relatively low 
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because being built up it has little to complete in the way of 
capital works whereas the larger town may tend to have a much higher 
rating level because of development requirements. This means that 
the ratepayers in-the smaller te>Wn wUl.generally oppose any attempt 
at amalgamation with the larger as it would simply mean, at least for 
them; increased rates with no additional benefit. 
A further interesting featw-e of the contemporary New Zealand 
scene 1s the presence of a large number of what are commonly termed 
'ad-hoc' authorities i.e. local authorities established to carry out 
some set purpose e.g. drainage in cities (urban drainage boards) or 
the eradication of rabbits· (rabbit boards). These forces which have 
succeeded in maintaining the large number of authorities have also 
had the effect· of making the demand for capital from the local 
authority ~ector of the market greater than what. it would otherwise be. 
They' have also had the effect of inhibiting the efficient use of capital 
r- ' ' ' 
as there can be no doubt that one large authority can use finance 
' ' . • • I ' . 
more efficiently than a large number. of small ones •. Not only. can a 
large authority operate more effectively upon the m,arket but it can 
. ' ', . ' ' 
generally put the capital which it does obtain to a more effective use. 
The Contr.ol of Borrowing 
An important characteristic of the market at present is the 
large degree of control and especially Cenqal Govern~ent control 
which is exerted over the borrowing activities of the local authorities. 
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This control operates from several different angles. Firstly there is 
the Local Authorities Loans Board which was established in 1926 
under the provisions of the Local Govemm ent Loans Board Act of 
that year. AU local authorities are required to obtain the approval 
of this institution before going on to the market. T'he Loans Board 
exercises both long term and short term control over the borrowing 
activities of the authorities in that as well as having the power to 
refuse to sanction a loan proposal it is endowed witl:l the power to 
permit or refuse the use of underwriting or procuration fees and, by 
the manipulation of the issue of orders in council, to control the 
amount of the sanction going onto the market. The rate of interest 
is also a very potent factor and, in accordance with the provisions 
of section 9(3) of the Local Authorities Loans Act 1956, the Minister 
of Finance has the power to set the maximum rate of interest which 
may be -paid by local authorities on money bOITowed. At the same 
time the Luans Board can set differential rates of interest lower than 
the maximum rate set by the Minister. Of course any authority could, 
if it could find a lender borrow free of interest or at a rate lower than 
that normally prescribed by the Loans Board. The power to adjust the 
rate of interest upon local authority stock provides the Central 
Government with what amounts to virtually absolute power over the 
market activities of the authorities because it could, if it so desired., 
adjust the rate of interest upon local authority stock to a figure lower 
than the ruling Government rate and so exclude the authorities 
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completely from the. market. The. Government, has however, never 
adopted ~uch a course. of action. 
· A further method of control ex·ercised ·by the Loans Board over 
·local authority borrowing is the Hmitation of the ·issue of orders in 
·council. This pra'ciice is usuaUy: carried ·out ori:ly in respect to 
ioans of fairly large amount. -'Thus approval may be given by the 
Board to the borrowing of an amount of say 1 £200, 000 with the 
stipulation that only £40,000 be raised initially. Hence a further 
order in council would be required before the authodty could raise 
any further amount •. On the other hand the Board could' stipulate 
that the loan be raised over a period of say five years and that not 
more than £40, 000 be raised in any one year. This JX'Ocedure would 
prevent an authority from going on to the market and raising the full 
amount of the loan in one lump sum. But the procedure is 1 to some 
extent governedby the nature of the subject matter of the loan e.g~ 
if the amount of £200,000 was required to purchase a building the 
full amount of the loan may have to be raised in one amount to meet 
settlement. But generally speaking most construction projects and 
especially road works can be spread over lengthy periods of time 
with payments falling due at set or irregular intervals. In suoh cases 
orders in council could be issued as the work required. This practice 
of limiting the issue of orders in council ·is of some value in times 
when there is considerable pressure upon the market because it has 
the effect of levelling out demand and preventing cycles created by 
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the presence of one or two very large issues upon the market. at the 
same time. 
To some extent control over the market is exercised by the 
authorities themselves especially in the financing of projects of 
marginal essentiality. If the authority can s.ee that it will experience 
difficulty in obtaining finance for a particular project it may well lay 
off the construction of that project until the market eases. As an 
ultimate backstop the very non-availability of finance itself will 
frequently act as a measure of control. 
A further interesting factor which operates to control market 
activity is the ability of an authority to spend money over any given 
period. The smaller authorities in particular seem to have a fairly 
tight spending limit and the availability of large amounts at their 
disposal appears to tax their resources somewhat. ·In conjunction 
with this we could mention the point that if there is strong competition 
for the services of builders and other contractors from the private 
sector the authorities frequently experience difficulty in finding some-
one to do their work for them and this fact could in tum limit their 
capital requirements. 
The r.ocal Authorities Loans Act 1956 grants to the ratepayers the 
power to object and require that a poll be taken upon a proposal to 
borrow. As a method of control this practice has some clear disadvant-
ages... On the one hand there is a tendency for expensive although 
essential projects to be rejected by the ratepayers while non-essential 
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•glamour projects' with widespread public appeal may be permitted to 
go ahead'without objection. Petty politics also play a part in loan 
polls and the ratepayers will frequently use a loan poll to vent spleen 
upon an unpopular council ot board irrespective of the merits of the 
prbject involved. It can be seen therefore that even at its best this 
method of control is ineffective.·and erratic. 
Hence it could be said that control is both long term and short 
term. It can operate to prohibit initial entry on to the market, and at 
the same time to control the amount of demand making itself felt upori 
the market. 
The question now arises as to the factors which have made this 
control necessary. These fall broadly into two categories. On the 
one hand there are farces inherent in the structtU'e of local government 
itself1 some of which have already been mentioned, while on the 
other hand there are factors present in the market which have made 
control necessary. As far as the authorities are concerned control 
is necessary to prevent reckless spending and to protect the ratepayers 
(who are ultimately called upon to foot the bill for all loan proposals) 
from being over committed. The authorities differ markedly tn size 
but from a legal point of view no distinction is made between the 
largest and the smallest. The Municipal Corporations Act 1954, 
accords the Arrowtown Borough with e:xactly the same borrowing 
powers as the Auckland City but the servicing of a loan of an amount 
of £100,000 ~ although likely to cause no great difficulty to the 
Auckland City would provide the Artowtown Borough with serious 
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problems. Control is therefore required t() prevent the smaller 
authorities from over stepping themselves. ·But a larger authority 
could equally well overstep itself with reckless borrowing if. it ~as 
already committed up to the hilt with the servicing of debt. If a 
particulat authority is already spending a ve1:y large portion of its 
annual income upon the servicing of lean charges the borrowing of an 
additional £10,000 could well prove embarrassing especially if the 
rating level of that authority is either. on or close to the maximum per-
mitted by statute. 
A further matter necessitating control is the trend of rateable 
values occurring in a particular locality. Some counties and boroughs 
(e.g. those on the West Coast and some of the Otago borou.ghs) are 
losing population fairly rapidly and in such circumstances it is 
reasonably certain that unless other factors intervene to compensate 
rateable values will decline. In such ctrcumstances therefore, an 
authority could well find that, although it is rating at the legal maxi-
mum 1t still has insufficient income to meet its annual commitments. 
The Borough of Kaitangata in South Otago is in this position at the 
present time and some of the difficulties which this s.ituation has 
created in the past are considered in the next section. Population 
drops generally have less effect in counties because land values in 
rural areas reflect agricultural productivity rather than residential 
demand. 
A further matter which makes control des.irable is that many of 
the smaller authorities are unable to employ staff who are competent 
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enough to raise loans tn an efficient manner. Loan raising is only 
one of the many tasks which the clerk of a local authority is called 
upon to perform and the clerk of a very small authorlty who is 
required to raise a loan oa:lce, i.n say every five years may obtain 
very little pra.ctise tn the art of judging the market. The larger 
authorities generally find it worth their 'while to employ staff who 
specialise in this class of work and indeed many of them become 
highly efficient. 
Consideration will now be given to a more detailed 
description of the two major elements of control i.e. the Local 
Authorities Loans Board and the rate of interest. 
The Local Authorities Loans Board 
A brief hlstory of the Loans Board ind cates the intention 
behind the establishment of the Board and helps to show what 
conditions are likely to prevail If the Board did not exist. 
The first restriction at all upon local authority borrowing 
appears to have been made by the Appropriation Act 1915 (sec 26) 
which required all local authorities to obtain the approval of the' 
Governor General in Council before going on to the market. This was 
purely a war time measure and indeed the section provided that it was 
to remain in force only so long as the War with Germany continued. 
The intention behind the measure seems to have been the control of 
interest rates so that the Government would have a free run upon the 
market to raise funds for its War effort. Prior to 1915 there appears 
to have been no restriction at all upon local authority borrowing. 
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In the boom years immediately following the War there was a 
considerable upsurge in borrowing activity and by 1926 the net debt 
of the local authority sector amounted to £54 m. with an amount of 
£6 m. raised in 1925. But it was obvious thnt much irresponsible 
borrowing had taken place in these years. (refer e.g. to Hansard 
Vo~209 1926 page J 15 Second Reading Debate on Local Government 
Loans Board B.tll.) The main source of trouble was apparently ths 
raistng of finance for works which were quite unnecE;ssary and the 
borrowing of money upun terms which considerably outlived the lives 
of the assets which were the subject matter of the loan. By 1925 
it was obvious that if the existing rate of borrowing continued the 
authorities would socn. be un"'ible to raise their demands without 
substantial increases in interest rates. Thus in 1926 the first 
overall instrument of control was introduced with the establishment 
of the Local Government Loans Boo.rd under .legislation bearing the 
same name. The Purliam~?nta.ry debates e-n this Bill (refer to Hansard 
Vo.209 1926; page 1155) indicate that there was no re~l opposition 
to the principle of control of local authority borrrr'!Ving although some 
members questioned the form that the control should take and tho 
c6mposttion of the proposed board. 
Just how potent as an Lnsttument of control the early loans 
Board was is somewhat difficult to ascertain but tt certainly did not 
succeed in preventing several local authorit.ies frcm <Jetttng into 
serious difficulties tn the Depress ion Years of the early 1930s. A 
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typical example is provided by the Thames Borough which in 1932 
was forced to hand over the control of its affairs to the Central 
Government. The preamble to the Thames Borough Commissioner Act 
1932 (Z3 Geo~ 1932 Local No.1) summarised the situation in a terse 
but coldly accurate manner, viz: 
"Whereas the Thames Borough Council has from time to time 
raised certa.in special loans under the Local Bodies' Loans 
Act, 1926, or former acts by thE: issue of debentures ot other 
Gecuritics secured upon the rateable property in the borough; 
And whereas as a result of the decrease in mining.operations 
in the borough and the general trade and economic depression 
at pr0sent affecting New Zealand, the said Council has found 
it impossible to collect its rates in full and consequently is 
not at present and ifl not likely in the near future to be able to 
pay in full as they fall due the annunl or other charges in 
respect of such loans; And whereas it has been agreed by the 
Council and a majority in value of the debenture holders that 
it is desirable that provision should be made for the temporary 
administration of the borough by a commissioner as hereine}fter 
provided." 
A similar situation prevailed in the Matakaoa County (refer to 
section 10 of the Local Legislation Act 1932). That County had 
apparently borrowed upon overdraft in excess of the limits permitted 
by the Local Bodies Finance Act of 1921-22. The Buller County also 
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experienced financial problems largely. through the necessity of 
having to service difficult terrain : but did not require .the institution 
of a controlling commi~;sioner. Some general rel1ef was afforded by 
the Local Authorities Interest Reduction and Loans Convers.ton Act 
of 1932. 
1.?-bl_? .No. A ••• J 
LOANS. BOARQ_APPT~ICATIO.NS A!ITD SANCT-IONS 
Total new 
Year . applications Sanctioned 
1927-28 4 i 636 ;649 4,260,981 
1928-29 6,007,045 4,675,772 
1929-30 4,218,730 4,5al,717 
1930-31 3,840,505 ·2.605,157 
1931~32 ::l,.<\12 ,365 3,265,005 
1932-33 2,951,645 2,754,752 
1933-3~ 3,884,132 3,661,805 
1934-35 3,859,363 3~965,395 
1935-36 4,061,076 3 t 602 I ·<tBO 
1936-37 2~804,308 2,841,671 
1~37-38 3,362,173 3,221,203 
1938·-39 5,138~917 rJ,201,397 
1939-40 2,674,450 2,057,260 
1940-41 5,336,640 1,312,.175 
1941-42 2,576,050 3;289,824 
19£1,2-43 2;780.270 2,618.120 
1943-44 3,797;790 3,709,090 
19L14--45 3,242;327 2,1135;927 
1945-46 31497,820 2;887,170 
1946 .... 47 9;843;543 8;295,866 
Table No. A ••• 1 (continued) 
~ 
1947-48 
1948-49 
1949-50 
.1950-51 
1951-52 
1952-53 
1953-54 
1954-55 
1955-56. 
1956-57 
1957-58 
1958-59 
1959-60 
1960-61 
1961-62 
1962-63 
Total new 
aQQlications Sanctioned 
8,724,579 7,481,914 
8,934,705 8,519,466 
8,062,758 7,364,177 
10,825,192 9,728,488 
15,092,761 14,920,543 
29,129,996 18,049,890 
24,908,485 24,282,014 
28,586,666 26,267,926 
22,503,906 15,899,655 
20,951,326 17,262,790 
3+,933,906 26,649,656 
21,510,318 21,079,746 
32,847,560 29,209,597 
37,685,555 35,123,005 
30,341,386 25,843,340 
31 , 351·, 914 29,331,564 
(Annual Reports of the Local 
Authorities Loans Board) 
16 
17 
This situation underlined the necessity for control and indeed the 
existence of the Loans Board has never been seriously questioned 
since its institution. 
The present provisions are to be found in the Local Authorities 
Loans Act 1956which provides for .a Board of seven members i.e. 
the Secretary to the Treasury 1 the Commissioner of Works and five 
other members to be appointed by the Governor General in Council. 
The three operative sections of the Act are 3 1 8 and 9. Section 3 
provides that no local authority· shall borrow .except with the prior 
approval of the Governor General in Council. Section 8 provides for 
the submission. of all loan proposals to the Board while section 9 sets 
out the manner .in which the Board may deal with a loan proposal. 
In determining the effect which the Loans Board has had upon 
the operation of the market we can submit the following points. 
Table No. A ••• 1 which sets out the amounts applied for (i.e. the 
new applications each year) against the amount sanctioned shows 
that theBoard has never made any really drastic reductions 1 as the 
amount sanctioned always represents a considerable proportion of the 
amount applied for. It will be noted that in a few instances the 
amount sanctioned is actually greater than the total of new applica-
tions for that year and this must mean that some amounts referred 
back or deferred from previous years were later sanctioned. Even in 
the depression years of the early thirties 1 or the years of extreme 
market stringency (1956-57) the Board apparently made little attempt 
to cut back applications in anything like a drastic manner. This 
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seemingly passive. policy is attributable mainly to two factors. 
Firstly there is a .strong tendency for the Board to be subject to 
political pressure and this applies .especially in the case of applica-
tions from the larger urban area·s which are able to marshaL a 
number of members of Parliament to their support if an application 
is declined. Secondly it is clear that the Board would reject an 
application that was obviously unnecessary or beyond the financial 
capacity of the particular authority and this has possibly given rise 
to a certain amount of caution in the submiss ton of applications to 
the Board. An application that was certain to be rejected would not 
be j;Ubm.itted in the first instance. The Board has introduced a com-
prehensive system of technical investigation of proposals and a. 
large percen.tage of rejections. ate upon technical rather than 
financial grounds • 
The restriction of the issue of Orders in Council is in reality 
Government, rather than Loans Board control but as it operates in 
complement with the Board's control this is the most appropriate 
place to deal with it. This process is carried out in accordance 
with the Act (i.e .. section 3) which provides that as well as the 
approval of the Loans Board the approval of the Governor General in 
Council is required before an authority can borrow upon the market. 
This , in effect, amounts to the control of the flow of a particular 
sanction on. to the market and as such of course is only of relevance 
in the case of fairly large applications. As previously stated the 
practice cannot be used in those cases where the loan amount must 
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all be paid out in one 1 um p sum. The policy which has been adopted 
in those cases where the amount of the loan is required over a period 
of time has been to restrict the amount of each Order in Council to 
the amount immediately required or perhaps to the amount required 
in any one year. It is possible that the Board itself would adopt a 
. policy of this nature and in some instances it has sanctioned pro-
posals. with the stipulation that only certain amounts be raised at 
any one time or in any one year. It is of note that in the case of 
hospital development, which 1.s usually carried out over a substantial 
period of time, the Board has adopted a policy of limiting Orders in 
Council to the amount necessary. to ·carry out two ·. years • work.. It 
is rather difficult to see that this practice can have any really sub-
stantial long term effect upon the demand for capital.· At best it 
offers a slight palliative and the most immediate result is to prevent 
the whole loan from going on to the market at the one time. 
As far as. necessity is concerned the Loans Board has adopted 
a very liberal approach and indeed very few proposals are declined 
on the ground of lack of necessity. The 1963 Annual Report of the 
Loans Board. contained the following remarks upon this question; 
"The majority of applications for new works submitted to the 
Board are for works which are essential for the health of the 
community or for the provision of services necessary for the 
economic development of a region. Applications which can 
be deferred or declined on the .ground of lack of necessity 
are few and mainly comprise items relating to amenities an:d 
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recreational facilities. However 1 the development of these 
items has come to be regarded as a highly desirable function of 
local government, the effectiveness of which would be lessened 
if local authority activities were confined solely to work relating 
to health and purely economic development." 
There is evidence that in the past, at least, the Loans Board has 
not made any concerted attempt at programming loan proposals in order 
of priority with the object of rationing out available finance more 
satisfactorily among various projects. Such a task would mean that 
the Board would require about three years advance knowledge of all 
proposals but at the present time liaison between the Board and the 
' ' 
individual authorities is by no means systematized. There are however 
indications that the Board is contemplating introducing such a system 
and the 1963 Annual Report of the Board contained the following 
statement. 
11 The Board considers that to overcome the financial problem 
involved with both annual and development loans 1 some method 
of determining priorities far new works might become necessary 
in the next few years. It has therefore asked the major local 
authority organisations to examine the position wi.th a view to 
obtaining a mutually satisfactory approach to the problem. " . 
On occasions directives have been. given to the Board by the 
Minister of Finance but evidence of direct Governmental 1 as distinct 
from political 1 interference with the Board is scant. Legislation 
passed in 1955 provided that the Board could in the exercise of its 
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powers have regard to the interests of'the national economy. The 
Board interpreted this legislation as imposing upon it a statutory 
obligation to examine priority in relation to the overall demand upon 
resources. Early in 1958 the Minister of Finance requested the 
Board to revie\V proposals more selectively in the light of the 
Country's economic and financial position. According to the l9i5:8 
Annual Report of the Board this directive was implemented accordingly. 
However, an examination of Table A ••• 1 reveals that sanctions in 
relation to applications for the year ended 31 March 1959 did not 
show any dramatic reduction.. This appears to indicate the extreme 
difficulty which the Board has in declining projects which it considers 
at all necessacy. 
In January 1961 a similar directive was given to the Board and 
the following comment appears in the Annual Report for the year ended 
31 March 1961. 
"In January 1961 the Minister of Finance asked the Board in 
view of the current heavy demands on available resources and 
the marked decline in overseas exchange reserves, to exercise 
its powers even more selectively. The Board has discussed 
ways and means of implementation without causing undue 
difficulties in prosecution of essential works. Most of the. 
proposals coming before it are however, correctly regarded as 
being in this category. The Board considers that a closer 
approach to the desired objective could be achieved by local 
authorities themselves reviewing their programmes of 
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uncommitted capital expenditure and slowing expenditure by 
deferring the. calling of tenders or reducing the scale of 
. operations so that the programmes are spread over a longer 
period. · The Board is endeavouring to sanction only loans for 
works m:ore urgently necessary: for community development. 
Even with that it seems the saving3 may not suffice to meet 
the demand. " 
In conclusion therefore, we may .state that the influence of the 
Loans Board upon the market has been largely passive; prohibitory 
rather than stimulative. Its position may be likened to that of a full 
back in a football game in that if he plays strictly in position he can 
only play the ball that comes to him. The Loans Board has acted 
almost eritirely as an instrument of control rather than direction. It 
has made some attempt to keep demand off the market and to ration 
out the available resources but it has made no effort to draw up 
clearly defined categories of priorities. Little conscious policy can 
be derived from an examination of the proposals rejected and· 
rejections appear to have been made at random rather than in accord-
ance with any predetermined plan. There can, however • be no doubt 
that the Board has had a beneficial influence in keeping the margin 
of completely irresponsible borrowers off the market and indeed, as 
stated, the very existence of the Board has probably deterred this 
class of borrower from appearing. 
It is clear then that the Board does not look upon itself as 
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having a central role to play in controlling the overall level of local 
authority capital expenditure. Its present composition indeed would 
be inappropriate for such a function. However 1 the Government's new 
emphasis upon the long term planning of expenditure of both Central 
and Local Government (refer t~ 1966 Economic Review page 22) to 
achieve a more even rate of growth 'will necessitate the long term 
' ' ' I ' ' ' 
programming of capital expenditure. This will possibly mean a re-
organisation of the Board and more control of the factors that at 
present inhibit close Central Government control over local capital 
expenditure 1 i.e. the time lag between sanction and the commencement 
of the work, unused sanctions, and the large volume of unused loan 
moneys held by the National Provident Investment Pool. 
The Rate of Interest 
It should be said at the outset that the rate of interest does not 
play as potent a role in the field of local investment as it does in 
some other sectors of the capital market but its influence can by no 
means be ignored. 
The rate of interest payable upon local authority stock and deb-
entures is not free; it is set by the Minister of Finance. At the out-
set therefore we must endeavour to determine the policy (if such 
exists) behind the establishment of the rate of interest. Over the 
years the rate of interest payable has fluctuated considerably. 
Table No. A ••• 2 sets out the maximum rates payable over the years 
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since the establishment of the Loans Board in 192'7. From an 
investors point of view, broadly speaking, local authority stock fall 
' ' 
into the same category as Gover~ment stock as both are what is 
generally termed 'gilt edged' investments, Both can offer virtually 
the maximum in security backing as one has the financial backing of 
the state while the other has the rating potential of the particular 
local authority. Both are trustee investments in accordance with the 
pr'ovisions of section 4 of the Trustee Act 1956. The type of invest-
or; then, who is attracted to local authority stock is similar to that 
attracted to Government Stock. Now the Government, in the interests 
of the national economy and the taxpayer, when borrowing endeavours 
to do so as cheaply as possible. Thus it has been necessary for the 
local authority interest rate to be set with reference to that rate of 
interest currently payable upon Government Stock. If the two rates 
happened to reach par.ity the local authorities would probably obtain 
no finance at all because of the superior security backing of the Goverr 
ment Stock. While on the other hand if the local authority rate was 
permitted to ri~e to any great extent above the Government rate the 
very slight security superiority of the Government Stock would be 
obliterated and the Government would find it difficult to obtain 
finance. The policy therefore, has . been to maintain a balance between 
local authority and Government interest rates and this has generally 
necessitated setting the local author.ity rate at about 1/8 tC? 1/4% 
above that, ruling on Government Stock. The following is a sample 
set of local authority interest rates showing in comparison the 
Government rates at the same time; 
~ 
1956 
1957 
~ 
1956 
1957 
Local Authority Rate 
Term 
5 years 
8 !I 
12 II 
5 years 
6 " 
Government Rate 
Term 
3 years 
5 " 
11 H 
3 years 
6 
~ 
4-3/8% 
4~% 
11-7/8% 
3 44% 
5% 
~ 
4,..:'3/8% 
4!% 
L}-5/8% 
4!% 
41% 
(1958 Annual Report of the Local 
Authorittes Loans Board.) 
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Referring again to Table No. A ••• 2 we see that the rate of 
interest has fluctuated considerably over the years. The maximum 
rate being 6% in 1927 and the minimum rate being 3!% in the years 
immediately following the Second World War. The policy therefore 
appears to have been to adjust the rates immediately any minor 
slackening or tightening of the market makes itself apparent. The 
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excessively high rates of the depression years are clearly shown 
while the low rates payable after the War are accounted for by the 
fact the local authority activity was at a very low ebb in those years 
and there was therefore a very low demand for capital. In some 
instances as many as three adjustments to the rate of interest have 
taken place in the one year e.g. in the Year ended 31 March 1962. 
On 8 May 1961 the rate was adjusted to 5% while on 20 July 1961 
the rate went to 5-1/8% and on 23 February 1962 yet a further 
increase took place to 5-3/8%. It would seem therefore that looked 
at from one point of view the rate of interest has been turned by the 
Government into a passive co...,efficient which is automatically 
adjusted in accordance with the flow of capital into the sector. It 
has been kept at the lowest possible level that will ensure at least 
a minimum flow of finance into this sector. There does not appear 
to have been any time at which the rate was permitted to rise to such 
an extent that investment was directed into this sector at the expense 
of the private or Government sector. Thus there is no question of a 
rate of interest that is free to adjust itself in accordance with market 
forces as it is artificially adjusted to that figure which will ensure a 
minimum flow of capital to this sector but at the same time wlll not 
hamper the operations of the Government upon the capital market. 
What influence has the rate of interest in inducing investors 
to put money into this sector of the capital market? In answering 
this question we must have regard to the nature of the investor who is 
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Table No. A,_ •• 2 
Maximum Interest Rate for Local Authority Loans 
Year 
1927 
1928 
1929 
1930 
1931 
1932 
1933 
1934 
1935 
1936 
1937 
1938 
1939 
1940 
1941 
1942 
1943 
1944 
Rate Year Rill. 
6% 1945 . 31% a 
S!% 1946 3t% 
5!% 1947 3-!-'% 
5i% 1948 3'1% 4.0 
5t% 1949 3l% 
5-i-% 1950 3t% 
d·% 1951 3t% 
4t% 1952 4% 
3!% 1953 4% 
3~% 1954 4% 
3f% 1955 4t% 
3t% 1956 4! ·'& 4+-i 7/8% 
4.1% 
.4 1957 5% 
4% 1958 5% 
4% 1959 5% 
3i% 1960 5% 
3t% 1961 4-7/8% 
3j% 1962 5, 5! & 5-3/8% 
(Report of the. Royal Commission on Local 
Authority Finance page 101 and the Annual 
Reports of the Local Authorities Loans Board) 
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attracted to local authority stock. In the case of trust funds, of 
course, the situation is geared by the provisions of section 4 of the 
Trustee Act 1956, but there is still a fair range of investments set 
out in section 4 (e.g. first mortgages) which generally carry a 
higher rate of interest than local authority stock. In many instances 1 
however, the investor is more concerned with building up a portfolio 
of investment rather than return and in such a case the large volume 
of money that can frequently be sunk into a single local authority 
loan, the length of term for which finance can be invested, and the 
ease of administering the investment, may be of importance in 
attracting money to this field. The Royal Commission on Local 
Authority Finance (see Report page 35) makes the following statement 
upon this matter 1 11We did not find that investors generally complained 
that interest rates were too low nor did they think that an increased 
rate would necessarily increase very greatly the amount of money 
that would be invested in local body loans." The vital point, 
therefore, seems to be the total volume of money available rather 
than the rate of interest. 
Although it is very difficultto obtain any accurate information 
upon the matter or indeed, to make any informed conjecture, it 
appears probable that continual changes in the rate of interest have 
an adverse effect upon investment in this sector. It is reasonable to 
assume that if a potential investor believes that rates are at their 
peak he will be likely to invest whereas if he thinks that they are 
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likely to rise he will not place 'his money until they have risen. 
But o·n the other hand if he just does riot know what will happen he 
will tend to invest short tem1 which in any event, seems to be the 
. . . ' 
practice of the sin all ihv'estot. Frequent changes can be very difficult 
in those cases· where a loan has not been fully sold as in such an 
' ' 
event it is possible that one part of the lOa.n may have to be floated 
upon a different interest rate from the other. 
The usual procedure now is for the Loans Board to Pr-escribe 
different rates of interest for different terms but although this has 
been the practice for the past few years it was not always the case. 
Until June 1956 the procedure had always been to set a single rate 
regardless of the term of the loan. However multiple rates are 
virtually im petative in those situations where some maturities are 
going to sell more readily than others or where you are seeking to 
obtain finance from a large number of different lenders. Generally 
speaking the open market will only accePt terms of up to ten years 
with the most desirable term possibly five years but such a term (at 
least in theory) is usually much too short for the local authorities. 
The longer term maturities therefore 1 almost inevitably 1 command 
higher interest rates than the shorter tenns. It is usual to set about 
three different rates, i.e. say, for terms of up to five years up to ten 
years, and above ten years. But this in turn can create some 
difficulties because in such an issue there would be a great tendency 
for the six and eleven year terms to sell very readily as these are the 
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shortest tenns at the higher rate of interest. To counter this the 
Loans Board frequently sUpulates that only a certain portion of the 
issue may be sold on a six year tenn. 
It is of some interest to conjecture upon the situation that would 
arise if interest rates were permitted to run free. l'he most ifJ'lmediate 
effect that would make itself felt would probably be a substantial 
rise in rates but at the same time a vast proliferation of different 
rates would almost certainly occur. Not only would a number of 
different rates appear for different terms but the smaller authorities 
would be forced to pay higher rates of interest than the larger ones 
an they would find it more difficult to obtain finance. Also it is quite 
possible thai: different rates may rule upon different projects as 
finance is sometimes more readily obtainable for one class of project 
than another. Thus a borough may find itself paying six per cent on 
fin<:tnce for a new library but eight per cent upon money required for a 
sewerage scheme. 
It has been sugg0sted that one means whereby investment in 
this sector, and especially long term investment, may be made more 
attractive would be to make issues (i.e. lor,g term issues) on the 
conditlon that the rate of intetest may be adjusted at say, three yearly 
intervals. The difficulty with such a proposition is that if adjustments 
are to be made upwards then no valid a~;"gument could be made out 
against downward adju~tments in the rate. But a provision in a loan 
contract to the etfect that the rate of interest is subject to downward 
adjustments would most certainly be a deteuont to l,'ll'ospective in\iesb:rs. 
DEMAND 
THE 
FOR 
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CAPITAL 
What do the authorities want loan finance for? What are the 
factors which affect the demand for loan finance? Is the demand 
spread evenly throughout the country and among the different classes 
of authorities? These are the questions which this section sets out 
to answer. 
Total Demand 
As the legislation requires (with a few insignificant exceptions) 
that all capital borrowing by local authorities must have the prior 
approval of the Loans Board it is possible to assess fairly accurately 
the total demand which will ultimately make itself felt upon the 
market by considering the total volume of loan applications sanctioned 
by the Board. At the same time the total volume of loan applications 
submitted to the Board reflects the amount which the authorities 
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would like to bartow upon the market .. These figures have already 
been set out in Table No. A ••• I in the preceding section. 
Section 40 of the Local Authorities Loans Act sets out expiry 
dates which provide for the lapse of a loan authority after the 
expiration of a certain period of time. If' any/ portion of the loan has 
been raised the balance of the sanction expires at the end of ten 
years from the date upon which the loan was sanctioned. If no part 
of the loan has been raised the expiry date i.s three years from the 
date of sanction, Thus it is reasonable to assume that loans sanctione< 
will make themselves felt as demand upon the market within a reason-
able time after sanction. A consideration of loans sanctioned shows 
the demand that is likely to make itself felt in the future but it is 
also possible to make an examination of the net debt of the authorities 
and so derive an indication of demand which has been made in the 
past. This concept is used later in this section in assessing regional 
demand. 
Referring to Table No. A ••• 1, we see that Loans sanctioned 
immediately following the Second World War were at a comparattyely 
low figure and that .there was only a steady rise until 1953 when a very 
steep increase occurred. This higher figure has been maintained in 
the years following 1953. The big increase in sanctions which took 
place in that year appears to have been caused by the sudden release 
of pent up war time demand. This did not make itself felt immediately 
after the War largely because the activity of the Government restricted 
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the operations of the authorities on the market until its own immediate 
capital requirements had pee~ satisfied. 
Table No. B ••• 1 sf,lts out the cap.ital investment executed by 
the Government, private and local government sectors over the years 
shown and shows each as a percentage of total capital investment. 
This Table, although useful., does not show the total volume of capital 
investment that the market is called upon to finance because consider-
able amounts of capital expenditure are now met from revenue and, 
as will be shown later, this portion is likely to increase. The Table 
is of value in showing the relative share of capital expenditure as 
between the three sectors and this could give some indicaUon of the 
portion of available capital that each of the sectors was entitled to. 
At the same time it could be argued that much of the capital 
expenditure carried out by the Government and and I,ocal Government 
sector may be of greater national and local importance than much of 
the wo.(k carried out by the private sector; after all the basic 
economic framework of the. country is provided by Government and 
local government. For reasons which will be considered more fully 
later the relative proportions of total capital expenditure carried out 
by each of the three sectors is. likely to change somewhat over the 
next three or four decades, i.e. the proportion met by the local 
government sector is likely to drop. 
At the same time however, we should take into consideration 
the point that figures for capital expenditure are very sensitive t.o 
Year 
1939 
1944 
1947 
1951 
1952 
1953 
1954 
1955 
1956 
1957 
1958 
Table No. B ••• 1 
GROSS CAPITAL INVESTMENT (excluding changes in st6cks) 
Private 
Ca~ital Investment 
£(m) %Total 
17 44 
14 50 
37 58 
74 60 
91 63 
98 57 
104 57 
130 61 
128 58 
120 54 
137 56 
Government Local Government 
CaQital Investment CaQital Investment 
£6n) %Total £(m). %Total 
16 41 6 15 
10 36 4 14 
21 33 6 9 
41 33 10 8 
41 28 12 8 
55 32 18 11 
57 31 21 11 
59 28 23 11 
67 30 26 12 
72 32 31 14 
72 30 35 14 
(Report of the Royal Commission on Local Authority 
Finance- page 113) 
w 
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fluctuations in the overseas exchange position of the national 
economy and any drastic tightening in the exchange position could 
cause a sharp drop in the total volume of capital investment with a 
proportionately greater drop in that amount carried out by the private 
sector. 
The Functions of Local Authorities 
The demand for capital from the local authorities is, to a 
large extent a function of the activities carried out by the local 
bodies and to fully appreciate the forces affecting the demand for 
capital it is necessary to pay at least passing attention to the 
operations of the various authorities. At the outset it should be 
said that all local authorities are the creation of statute and their 
powers are closely defined in the various em power.ing and enabling 
acts. A local authority can do only that which is set out in its 
constituting act because they are subsidiary governmental institutions 
and possess no sovereign legislative powers in their own right. 
In function and structure the authorities differ markedly. 
Municipalities (which include cities, boroughs, and town districts) 
derive their powers from the provisions of the Municipal Corporations 
Act 1954. These authorities are responsible for the internal 
administration of the municipal areas and their main functions are 
the provision of civic amenities such as sewerage and water 
reticulation, roading, and public trans port. The demand for loan 
finance is generally geared to the provision of works of this 
nature. But considerable civic building and housing activity is 
36 
· also undertaken by municipalities and this has consumed substantial 
·amounts of capital in the post war years. In recent years many 
boroughs have undertaken pensioner-housing schemes and for this 
class of work subsidies are made available to local authorities 
through the Department Of Health. This has had a dual effect for on 
the one hand it has alleviated somewhat the amount which the 
authorities have been required to· seek upon the market while on the 
other hand the existence of the subsidy scheme has doubtless 
induced many municipalities who would not otherwise have con-
sidered this wcrk to undertake it. ·The provision of ·municipal 
buildings such as museums, art galleries, office accommodation 
and libraries is now looked upon as the legitimate prerogative of 
the boroughs. The construction of airports has also consumed 
considerable amounts of capital in the post war years and this work 
is also subject to-a considerable amount of assistance from · 
Government~ Municipalities occasionally seek loan finance for 
the renewal of plant and the replacement of such items as omnibuses 
but these are frequently financed from depreciation and renewal 
funds which are built up from appropriations from rate revenue or 
trading profits, if such are available. 
In some areas special 'ad-hoc' authorities have been 
established to carry out specific operations, e.g. the various 
37 
transport boards, and the metropolitan drainage boards established 
in Dunedin, Christchurch, Auckland and upon the North Shore. 
These institutions. are necessary in order. to obtain the co"""otdination 
of these services in those districts where several different 
territorial authorities exist. Authorities of this nature all derive 
their powers including the power to borrow, from individual 
empowering acts. In the Auckland Urban area the two drainage 
boards. provide the main trunk sewers while the individual 
territorial authorities are responsible for installing the lateral 
conneCtions. The urban drainage boards have been very heavy 
borrowers upon the market in the post-war, years and this demand is 
likely to continue with the .increase in population. 
The following figures show the loans sanctioned for the . 
metropolitan dratnage boards over three yeats and give· an . · 
indication of the vast amounts of finance which these bodies have 
consumed. 
Christehurch 
Dunedin 
Hutt Valley 
£600,000 
£2so,ooo· 
£210,000 
£1,060,000 
Auckland 
Christchurch 
Auckland 
North Shore 
£2,600,000 
£1,580,000 
£1,000,000 
£1,000,000 
£3,580,000 
(The above figures were taken from the 
text of the Annual Reports of the Local 
Authorities Loans Board for the years 
1961-1963 .) 
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It should be pointed out that the figures given above do not include 
sanctions granted to territorial authorities in the various constituent 
areas to carry out lateral reticulation in conjunction with the work of 
the drainage boards. 
Harbour Boards der.ive their authority from the Harbours Act 
1950. Harbour works tend to be so expensive, and vital from a 
national as well as a local point of view, that the legislature has 
deemed it expedient to require that all harbour boards should have 
the approval of Parliament in the form of an individual empowering 
act as well as the approval of the Loans Board before they can go on 
to the market. This means that any proposal involving borrowing by 
a harbour board is subject to criticism in Parliament. A feature of 
harbour board borrowing over the past few years has been the heavy 
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amounts demanded by the secondary boards. 
The counties which, in the main are responsible for the 
territorial control of the rural areas of the Country I are not generally 
large borrowers of finance; their capital requirements being confined 
largely to bridge and road construction and maintenance work which 
is subsidised heavily from National Roads Board funds. It has been 
the policy of many counties to attempt to meet as much reading 
expenditure as possible from revenue. On the other hand there are a 
few heavily urbanised counties, such as Waitemata, Wa imairi, and 
Manukau which are faced with development problems simtlar to those 
of the larger cities and 1 of course,· have a comparable demand for 
capitill. 
Hospital boards, which are responsible for the administration 
of hospital districts have been very heavy borrowers over the past 
ten .or so years. Like harbour boards, hospital board borrowing has 
become vecy subject to control by the Government and all loan pro-
posals must have the approv<Jl of the Hospital Works Committee, as 
well as the sanction of the Loans Board, befqre market activity can 
be undertaken. In past years hospital boards possessed rating powers 
but these have now been lost and these boards are financed entirely 
from Government funds. Section 89(1) of the Hospitals Act 1957 
provides as follows:-
"In respect of every financial year there shall be paid to the 
Board by way of grant, out of money appropriated by 
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Parliament .for that purpose such sum as the Minister may 
determine as being necessary to enable the Board to carry 
out its functions having regard to the estimates for that year 
approved under section eighty eight of this Act." 
These annual grants made to the hospital boards cover revenue 
expenditure including loan charges but the boards are still required 
to seek loan finance to meet major capital items but some very small 
amounts of capital expenditure are frequently met from the annual 
grant. 
In effect, therefore, these boards could be looked upon as 
local spending agencies of the Central Government and it appears that 
the locally elected members of these boards are retained merely for 
the purpose of preserving some semblance of local autonomy. The 
peculiar position of hospital boards has had a singular effect upon 
their abHity to obtain finance and this matter is considered later in 
the section dealing with the flow of capital. 
From time to time individual authorities which have been 
designed to manage a single asset have made an appearance. The 
two most notable of these in recent years being the Auckland Harbour 
Bridge Authority and the ChristchUrch Lyttelton Road Tunnel Authority. 
Both of these authorities derive their powers from individual empower-
ing acts. Although these two bodies have consumed considerable 
volumes of capital over the past few years their demand will probably 
not be of a continuing nature and it is unlikely that other authorities 
of a like nature will make an appearance in the near future. 
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P6we.i" reticulation is the function of the power boards but in 
many instances this activity (and in a very few cases power generat1o1 
is carried out by municipalities. Power boards derive their authority 
from the Electric Power Boards Act 192 5 and these institutions have 
been very active upon the market in recent years. 
The functions of the numerous other minor bodies such as 
rabbit boards and catchment boards can be readily assumed from their 
names and in any event they are insignificant as borrowers of 
capital finance. 
Table No. B ••• 2 sets out the loans sanctioned in respect to 
the particular class of local body. It can be seen that there is a 
wide variation in the amounts demanded by the different classes of 
bodies. It will be noted that there are six classes of local authorities 
whose demand figures amount to well in excess of 7 5% of the total 
figures. 
Table No. B .... 3 sets out sanctions tn accordance with the 
purpose of the loan.: It can be seen that three of the largest items in 
this Table are the prerogative of separate classes of authorities t. e. 
hospital boards 1 electric power hoards 1 and hnrbour boards. 
The territorial local authorities derive their incomes from 
rates levied over either the annual, capital, or unimproved values of 
all the rateable property within their districts, and in some special 
instances, upon property outside their districts. Most municipalities 
rate upon the unimproved values of their property while a few rate 
upon the annual value system and a very few on the capital .value 
Counties 
Boroughs 
Town Districts 
Catcbment Boards 
Land Drainage Boards 
Electric Power Boards 
Urban Drainage Boc>rds 
Urban Trans port Boards 
Road Tunn_el Authority 
Harbour Bridge Aut:r~ority 
Rabbit Boards 
Fire Boards 
Harbour Boards 
Hos pita! Boards 
Table No .• B •• , 2 
Loans Sanctioned by Class of Local Authority 
1960 1961 1962 
1,386,340 2,262,014 2,797_,112 
8.,654 .. 557 ·11,726,125 11.,648,7i~Q 
4,571 84,000 11.:1,800 
138,530 235_,350 337.,250 
- 14,000 
2,463,150 2,671_,750 3,941,800 
742,600 2,7~14,700 3.,0~14,460 
200,000 - 200,000 
- 31250,000 
500,000 ~~2, 300 
9,000 11,270 23_,700 
205,363 188_.,430 132,.900 
41185,100 2_,150,200 4, 6<14_, 140 
61324t700 3,4.19,500 3,412,150 
£ 24,813,911 28,'799_,639 30,297,052 
(Report on the Local Authority Statistics of New 
Zealand - Department of Statistics) 
.~ 
I.'V 
·waterworks 
Drainage & Sewerage 
Roads & Bridges 
Public Buildings 
Housing 
Transport 
Airports 
Recreation 
Electricity Supply 
Hospital Works 
Harbour Works 
Fire Services 
Gas Works 
Abattoirs 
Machinery 
River Works 
Miscellaneous 
Table No. B ••• 3 
Loans Sanctioned by Subject Matter of Loan 
1960 1961 1962 1963 
1,276,175 4,252,550 1,401,460 2,551.590 
2,935,719 7,043.350 6,970,200 4,455.150 
1,970,550 1,549,550 2 '101 ,A.80 1,419,400 
9,87,550 2,227,800 1,470,750 1,654~650 
1,255,298 1,183,866 986,350 1,179,510 
1,282,230 12,000 200,000 
497,000 3,780,000 31,500 348,925 
712,000 466,200 268,900 403,600 
3,067,900 4,311,000 3,048,600 3,413,250 
5,542,'700 5,142,000 2,384,000 3,568,000 
3,911,100 3,418,350 3,~78,900 5,269,500 
301,tl75 146,230 158,800 151,550 
- 165,000 31,600 15,000 
549,650 350 31,000 42,500 
39,500 91,950 92,700 14,600 
55,450 285,550 594,500 468,000 
4,588,500 572,754 723,000 797,750 
£ 28,972,797 34,648.SOC 24,042,760 25,752,975 
= -
(Annual Reports of the Local 
Au.thoritles Loans Board 1961-1963) 
~~ 
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system. The counties are divided about equally between the capital 
and unimproved systems while no counties rate on the annual value 
system. Many munictpalittes possess trading undertakings of some 
description or other from which they derive some measure of income 
(e.g. the supply of electricity) or which incur a loss which has to be 
reimbursed from some other source (e. g. public transport). Catchment 
and rabbit boards possess direct rating power (which is frequently 
exercised by the levy of a differenttaJ rate) but the major 'ad-hoc' 
authorities (e.g. urban drainage and transport boards) although in 
possession of direct rating power usually collect their rates by 
means of a levy over the terr.ttorial authorities within their districts. 
Power boards are still statutorily possessed of rating power but now 
. '• ,, . 
derive their incomes mahtly ,from revenue sources, i.e. from the sale 
of elect.ric power frequently supplemented by the sale of electrlcal 
appliances through retail stores. It !s from this income that the loan 
charges incurred hy the authorities are met. Section 48 of the Local 
.Authortties Loans Act 1956 provides that loan charges may be met 
from either the general account or the proceeds of a special rate. 
As the generd account is: financed mainly from the revenue of general 
rates the rate revenue is used to meet loan charges in either event. 
Sectt.on 45 of the above Act sets out the security which may be 
pledged in respect of a lo<'in i.e. it may be either a special rate or 
the property or revenue (derived from any source) of the local 
authority. Money received or receivable from the Crown and money 
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already appropriated cannot be pledged as security. The different 
securities pledged for the loan (i.e. if there is more than one 
security pledged) are jointly and severally liable for the whole 
amount of the loan. 
The Factors Affecting Demand 
In some cases the topographical structure of the terrain upon 
which the town is situated has required the expenditure of more 
capital in order to effect development works than would otherwise 
have been the case, In the case of Wellington City, for example, 
very steep hill country has to be contended with and this has necessi-
tated the use of heavy earthmoving machinery in order to install 
subdivisions and effect other construction works. Another problem 
town in this respect is the Borough of East Coast Bays in the Auckland 
Urban area. This Town is strung out along the coast and is divided 
into several semt...:.tsolated pockets; facts which have made it very 
difficult to serve the Town with water and sewerage reticulation. On 
the other hand boroughs which are located upon dead level areas are 
not called upon to meet the same high cost in installing services. 
Construction works also tend to be somewhat more expensive in 
isolated towns where contractors may be required to move their men 
and machinery many miles before they can start work. 
In some towns the residents may be continually demanding of 
their counctls that certain works be carried out while other boroughs 
may possess ratepayers who are prepared to let grass grow in the main 
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street but don't want rates raised in any circumstances. Many small 
. country boroughs are in this latter category. in s~me instances 
councils are fired with a more progressive spirit e.g. in the case of 
Lower Hutt City many·works, especially in the way of civic buildings 
have been carried out which could well have been foregone. This 
situation frequently arises where several towns are in close proximity 
with each other and there is a tendency for them to compete in the 
provision of civic amenities. These circumstances have involved the 
excessive use of capital funds while at the same time requiring the 
ratepayers to meet heavier rate demands. 
In some cases capi'till demand is maintained at a high level by 
rea son of the standard of building required. This has been an important 
factor in the construction of many hospital works and especially in the 
case of nurses' homes. It is possible that the shortage of nurses 
in recent years has tempted the construction of very elaborate 
buildings. 
Government policy is also a force which has had a very potent 
effect upon the demand for finance. If the Government decides to 
offer inducements by way of subsidies upon certain works demand for 
ioan capital to finance this class of wotk will almost certainly 
increase. A good example of this is the subsidising of pensioner 
housing schemes. There can be no doubt that sohemes of this nature 
induce local authorities to indulge in these works and they generally 
resort to the loan market to seek the balance .of the capital required. 
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It has largely been local pressure that has caused the develop-
ment of several small harbours and this has caused a big capital 
demand for this type of work in recent years • If shipping in New 
Zealand was more centralised upon the major ports much of the heavy 
capital expenditure sunk into the development of secondary ports in 
recent years could have been avoided. But local parochialism has 
kept the smaller ports open. In some instances harbour boards have 
' ' ' 
made play to local farmers of the fact that the closure of a small port 
would involve them in increased transport costs. The following is a 
sample of loans sanctioned for secondary harbour boards over the 
past few years. The schedule is by no means exhaustive. 
Gisborne 
Southland 
Whangarei 
Southland 
£655;000 
650 i 000 
£1,500,000 (required for the oil refinery) 
725,000 (required for the installation 
of a mechanical meat loader) 
Southland 
Picton 
Nelson 
Tauranga 
Timaru 
£493,600 
100,000 
420,000 
500,000 
520,000 
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(The above figures were taken from the texts 
of the Annual Reports of the Local Authorities 
Loans Board 1960-1963) 
Table No. B ••• 4 sets out the net debts of all the harbour boards in 
New Zealand which handle overseas shipping as at 30 September 
1961 .... later ·figures are not available. The Table demonstrates 
clearly the relative dominance of the secondary boards as consumers 
of loan capital. 
If authorities were able to meet capital works from their own 
revenue then it is reasonable to assume that they would refrain from 
seeking loan finance to satisfy their capital requirements. ·Now in 
respect to income local authorities fall into two fairly clearly defined 
groups. The territorial authorities, i.e. the counties and boroughs 
derive the:lr income very largely from rates levied upon the land 
within their boundaries many of these bodies generally have other 
sources of income but these are usually insignificant (i.e. with a few 
notable exceptions e.g. the Borough of Stratford together with a few 
other small boroughs virtually live off their electricity undertakings). 
On the other hand we have the local authorities which rely mainly upon 
Table No, B., .4. 
Net Debt of New Zealand Harbour Bo~rqs 
as at 30 Seotember 1961 . 
Auckland £6,578,557 
Whangarei 709,585 
Bay of Islands 199,660 
'faW'anga 
Napier 
Gisborne 
Taranaki 
·wellington 
Marlborough 
Nelson 
LYttelton 
Timaru 
Otago 
Southland 
546,256 
l,L.68,592 
676,200 
l,644,03:l 
1,276,039 
308,619 
784,453 
2,607,560 
745,516 
755,604 
4,748,815 
(Report of the Local Authority Statistics 
of New Zealand; Department of 
Statistics) 
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trading income I supplemented in a few cases by limited rating power. 
This group includes power boards and harbour boards. 
Now rating liability falls not upon the entire population but upon 
a relatively small group of land owners. Debate has raged as to whethe 
or not rates constitute an intolerable burden upon the ratepayer but it 
is certain that any substantial increase in rates designed for the 
purpose of enabling the authorities to meet more capital works from 
revenue would be hotly opposed. On the other hand the revenue pro-
ducing authorities would be in a somewhat better position to meet 
capital expenditure from revenue. Before we go any further, however, 
it would be as well to point out that in the ultimate outcome all 
capital expenditure is met from revenue, whether that revenue be 
from rates or trading concerns .. The financing of capital works from 
loans 1 however 1 has the effect of spreading the expenditure over a 
longer period of time but at the same time it is inevitably more costly 
in the long run because of the outlay in interest. 
In some instances the use of loan finance would clearly be 
uneconomic; to borrow e.g. say I amounts of one hundred pounds per 
year over a considerable period of time, each I upon say I twenty year 
terms 1 would be unprofitable because after about the twelfth year the 
amount paid out annually in interest and loan charges would begin to 
exceed the annual amount borrowed. Thus it is usually preferable to 
meet the cost of many m'tnor and continually recurring items I such as 
street works 1 from revenue. Indeed many counties and small boroughs 
51 
who are faced with only this sort of expenditure hardly resort to the 
market at all~ But when it is desired to create a durable asset which 
will have a long life it is frequently desirable to use loan finance rathe1 
than revenue so that the cost may be spread into the future thus enablin 
future ratepayers, who will also derive benefit from the project, to 
foot a portion of the cost. 
A further. point of relevance is the method of finance imposed upon 
the authorities by statute. The .territorial authorities are required to 
draw up annual estimates of expenditure and then strike a rate of so 
much in the pound to cover that expenditure. The building up of general 
reserves is not permitted and as previously stated any substantial 
increase in rates is likely to meet with considerable opposition. But 
the authorities which rely matnly upon trading income, such as power 
and harbour boards, are usually able to appropriate large sums annually 
to general reser~s and then, at some later date, make use of the 
reserves to finance capital works.' If this is done the point made 
above about the spreading of capita 1 cost is effected in ;reverse. When 
power reticulation has reached the saturation stage and harbour 
development settles down it is possible that these classes of authori-
ties will be able to satisfy most if not all of their capital requirements 
from revenue. 
Hence in concluding this portion of the argument we could 
summarise by saying that it is frequently desirable, irrespective of 
ability to pay, to meet the· cost of capital works from revenue; that the 
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trading authorities will probably be able to meet increasing amounts 
of capital expenditure from revenue; many territorial authorities who 
are faced only with small items will be able to meet them from revenue 
but that loan finance will still be required to meet the major capita~ 
wor~s of the territorial and 'ad-hoc' authorities. 
Table No. B ••• 5 gives an indication of the relative amounts 
met from loan_ finance and from revenue. Reference to part 1 of the 
Tc:!ble shows that there is a tendency for the older established authori-
ties, e.g. Wairoa and Newmarket to meet proportionately larger amount! 
ofcapital expenditure from revenue than the newer more rapidly 
developing boroughs such as East Coast Bays and Tauranga. The 
figures for the Makara County run completely against the general trend 
for counties. This was brought about by the fact that the bulk of 
capital expenditure in that Courty was carried out 1n respect or urban 
develop~ent in the Porirua County To\vn and was secured over that 
Town. In effect therefore, the figures for Makara could be looked upon 
as the figures for a very rapidly developing borough rather than as 
the figures for a county. It is of interest to note that since 19 62 this 
County has been disbanded; the rural portion being amalgamated with 
the Hutt County while the urban areas have been constituted into the 
new Porirua City. A further point of interest in the Table ts the very 
large amount of capital expenditure met from revenue by the Southland 
County. 
But probably the most important factor affecting the demand for 
capital is population growth. The demand for capital for such works 
Table No. B.,. 5 
(Part 1) 
53 
A Random Sample of Local Authorities Showing the 
Source.s of Capita! Expenditure . 
All Figures as at .31 Marcil 19~2 
Boroughs From Revenue From Loan 
Kaltata 20,326 16,264 
Whangarei 111,859 45,104 
Auckland 676,975 1,670,458 
East Coast Bays 14,555 124,790 
Newmarket 1,795 96 
Ngaruawahla 11,417 
Wairoa 30,991 
Tauranga 152,813 129,066 
Counties. 
Mangonui 88,142 
Waitemata 532,660 260,531 
Whakatane 107,270 
Stratford 100,006 5,420 
Makara 54,656 
Waimairi 99,739 116,629 
Ashburton 164,004 
Sou~hland 446~272 5,545 
Total Figures 
Boroughs 6,985,053 8,374,768 
Counties 8,727,428 1,517,766 
(Report on the Local Authority Statistics of New 
Zealand, Department of ~tatistics) 
~ 
1939 
1944 
1949 
1954 
1956 
1962 
X!!r 
1953. 
1954 
1955. 
1961 
Table. No •. B ••.•. 5 
(~art :2) 
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Loan Receipts and Capital Exwnditure 
Electric Power Boards 
Loan Receipts 
742,015 
86,800 
1,318,864 
2,435,657 
2,862,077 
3,012,340 
Capital Expenditure 
776,296 
337,588 
1,682,750 
4,793,206 
3,912,211 
5,030,190 
Harbour Bogrds Capital Expenditure 
From Revenue From Loan 
416,199· 1,571,055 
362,259 1,102 ,a11 · 
500,781 1,277,348 
792,866 3,238,292 
(Report on the Local Authority 
Statistics of New Zealand, 
Department of Statistics) 
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as housing subdivisions, hospital works and power reticulation tends 
to be related fairly closely to population growth. It can be assumed 
that an area with a rapidly growing population will generally require 
more capital than an area with a static population. 
Owing to the diverse multiplicity of factors which intervene 
it would be virtually impossible to derive any quantitative relationship 
between capital demand and population growth. But we can, by 
making an examination of figures for net debt per head of population, 
produce statistics which may help to demonstrate the position. 
Firstly let us take the full number of debtless boroughs and counties 
in New Zealand and examine their rates of population growth. The 
fact that a local authority is debtless indicates that its activities 
upon the market have been negligible fer at least the past five years. 
Table No. B ••• 6 excludes authorities situated in the Auckland Urban 
Area where net debt figures are cornp.licated sornev1hat by the presence 
of the debt structure of the larg-e number of 'ad-hoc' authorities 
meaning that terrttcr.i-:1l authorities in the Area would tend to show a 
smaller net debt per head of population than isolated boroughs where 
all the services are provided by th~ territorial authority. 
The debtless local authorities are for the most part very low in 
the order of population growth but one or t\~o notable exceptions are 
obvious in the table. We see that the Halswell County has, in fact, 
one of the highest rates of population gro\vth in New Zealand and yet it 
appears in the schedule of debtless authoriti.es. This is probably 
Total Counties 
Total Boroughs 
Overall 
Table No .. B ••• 6 
·Net Debt per Head 
As at 31 March 1966 
Population Net Debt 
.879 ,21.0 10,706,831 
. 1,578 t 170 §.6,2~(.66 
2,457,380 76,958,597 
Debtless Local Authorities 
Rate of Population 
Growth 1956-62 
Opotlki County 
- 5.2 
Uawa County 1.1 
Eltham County - 0.3 
Waimarino County -13.7 
Oroua County 
-
1,1 
Wairewa County -12.8 
Taieri County 8,.6 
Tuapeka ·County -37,4 
Ktimara Borough ... 3.1 
Hampden Borough 
-
1~3 
Lawrence Borough o.a 
Hal swell County 84.4 
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Debt per Head 
12.17 
41.98 
31.31 
·' 
Population 
as at 31/3/62 
4,850 
1, i40 
3,610 
2,270 
4,550 
780 
7,980 
4,800 
430 
300 
s9o 
3,220 
Table No~·. B ••• 6 (continued) 
Local Authorities with the Slowest Rate of Population Growth 
Population Growth Population Net Debt Net Debt per 
1956-61 Head 
Hokianga County ~1s.o 5,920 13 '202 2.:·2"2 
Clifton County :.. 6.2 2.580 27,156 10"'52 
Tua peka County -37.4 4,800 
Waimarino County -13~7 
. ' 
2~270 -. 
Buller County · -10.5 4,040 29v860 7.3S 
Inangahu.a County 
- 8.2 3,060 14,472 4 .. 72 
Golden Bay County - 9.5 3,650 19,660 5~38 
Waihemo County - 8.7 990 3,449 3.48 
Palmerston Borough - 8.7 870 13.,434 15.44 
Naseby Borough -18.5 150 4,667 3.11 
Vincent County -16.5 4,010 14,838 3.70 
Wairewa County -12.8 780 
{the above figures are as (The above figures were compiled from 
at 31 March 1962) the Report on the Local Authority 
Statistics of New Zealand - Department 
of Statistics) (11 
-..;J 
Table No~ B.~; 6 (continued) 
Local Authorities with the Fastest Rate of Population Growth 
Taupo Borough 
Mt. Maunganui Borough 
Taupo County 
Kawerau Borough 
Taradale Borough 
Havelock North Borough 
Tawa Borough _ 
Hutt County 
Upper Rutt Borough 
Halswdl County 
Waitaki Ccunty 
Mosgiel Bc·rcugh. 
(The above figw·es were au 
at 31 March 1962) 
Population Growth 
1956-61 
84.7 
48.3 
35.9 
63.9 
42~6 
37.0 
78 .. 2 
45.6 
37 .. 9 
8•:!.4 
36.7 
59.4 
, Population 
5,760 
5,690 
12 1750 
5,390 
5,250 
4,050 
7,600 
32,400 
17,550 
3,220 
11,400 
6,810 
Net Debt 
-
521,899 
264c,305 
14,772 
199,636 
83.,850 
75,656 
520#152 
943,862 
1,064,483 
-
97,2:23 
218,586 
Net Debt per 
Head 
90 ... 60 
46 ... 45 
1.15 
37-.o-3 
15-.97 
18.68 
68.44 
29.13 
6-0.65 
8.S3 
32.09 
{The above figtires w-ere com piled from 
j· 
the Report on the Local Authority 
Statisticsc::of NeW Zealand -
/.": 
Department oYS'tatistlcs) 
/' Q"l. 
co 
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accounted for in the proximity of that County to Christchurch City. 
Although the County has taken some population overflow from the 
City considerable areas of the County ha\1(;· been absorbed into the 
City upon becoming bu!lt. up, meaning that the City has been com-
pelled to bear the cost of servicing and thus leaving the County to 
cope with the purely rural areas of the dtstrlct. A somewhat .similar 
situation exists in the relationship between Taieri County and the 
Mosgiel Borough. 
A further interesting feature of the debtless local authorities is 
that they are nearly all counties and the three excoptions are all 
defunct South Island boroughs. 
The local authorities with the most rapid rate of population 
growtll, in general, exhibit net debts far in excess of the standard 
but here a;rain one or two i.nteresting exceptions occur. Waitaki 
County has a very low net debt but the population figures for that 
County have been greatly inflated by the inflOV\r of 1N'Otkers required 
for the hydro-electric development. But the full cost of this develop-
ment has been met by the Government and has therefore not reflected 
in the debt figures of the County. 
iNe see also that the Taupo County exhibits an abnormally low 
net debt figure as compared with its rap.td rate of population growth. 
Development problems associated with that County were considered to 
be of such n nature that the Government assumed virtually the full 
cost burden and indeed it is only in recent years that the County has 
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assumed the status of a fully autonomous local authority. The demand 
for capital from this County has therefore been considerably restricted. 
Local authorities with very slow rates of population growth 
almost without exception exhibit net debts well below the overall 
standard for the particular class of authority. 
Thus in concluding this portion of the argument we can make 
the point that a local authority with a high rate of population growth 
will generally possess a demand for capital which is in excess of the 
average while the converse proposition is, in~neral, also true. 
The figures for net debt which are given in Table No. B ••• 6 
include the full funded debt of the local authority with the amount of 
accumulated sinking funds deducted. 
Regional Demand 
~we have seen that the demand for capital is not spread evenly 
throughout the different classes of local authorities. But at the same 
time demand is not spread evenly throughout the Country. Some areas 
demand more capital than do others. In Table No. B ••• 7 we once 
again lesort to the net debt figures to demonstrate capital demand. 
This Table sets out the debt of all the local authorities comprised in 
the four major urban areas. The very heavy preponderance of demand 
concentrated in the Auckland Area is clearly demonstrated by this 
Table. For reference purposes we have also included, where relevant, 
the population figures and these assist in showing the great 
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Table No. B ••• 7 
The Net Debts of the Major Urban Areas 
(as at 31 March 1962) 
Auckland Urban Area 
Auckland City 
East Coast Bays Borough 
Birkenhead Borough 
Northcote Borough 
Takapuna City 
Devonport Borough 
Henderson Borough 
Glen Eden Borough 
New Lynn Borough 
Newmarket Borough 
Mount Albert Borough 
M aunt Eden Borough 
Mount Roskill Borough 
One Tree Hill Borough 
Onehunga Borough 
Ellerslie Borough 
Mount INellington Borough 
Howlck Borough 
Otahuhu Borough 
Papatoetoe Borough 
Manurewa Borough 
Papa kura Borough 
Waitemata County 
Manukau County 
*Auckland Harbour Board 
Auckland Harbour Bridge .A.thy. 
Auckland Trans port Board 
Auckland Electric Power Bd. 
Waitemata Electric Power Bd. 
Auckland Drainage Board 
North Shore Drainage Board 
* As at 3 0 September, 19 61. 
Net Debt 
13,506,966 
462,774 
31'7 ,420 
229,974 
482,304 
232, 2~W 
275,812 
95,288 
::125 1239 
137,768 
950,480 
256 ,4'7~-i 
1,268,055 
2491 784. 
1W3, 308 
111,768 
L121,3Gl 
237,795 
244,471 
4.17,084 
397,318 
16'7 ,841 
1,031,135 
642,619 
6,578,557 
6,389,040 
2,550,470 
3,961,022 
1,902,812 
12,170,884 
1,310,102 
£58,728,154 
Population 
145,000 
10,000 
8,030 
5,780 
21,000 
11,000 
4,260 
5,370 
9,080 
1,810 
26,000 
18,350 
31,000 
12,850 
1G,300 
4,4.20 
16,650 
G,940 
8,800 
18,900 
12,550 
8,740 
58,100 
32,000 
492,930 
Table No. B.,. 7 (continued) 
Wellington Urban Area 
Wellington City 
Lower Hutt. City 
Upper Hutt Borough 
. Petpne Borough 
Eastbourne Borough 
Tawa Borough 
•. Hutt County 
Makara. County 
Hutt Valley Drainage Board 
*Wellington Harbour Board 
Hutt Valley Power Board 
Dunedin Urban Area 
Dunedin City 
Mosgiel Borough 
St. Kilda Borough 
Port Chalmers Borough 
West Harbour Borough 
Green Island Borough 
*Otago Harbour Board 
Dunedin Drainage Board 
Ta teri County 
* As at 3 0 September l$1. 
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(as at 31March 1962) · 
9.,071,525 
2,645,951 
1,064,483 
~36,051 
154,400 
520,152 
943,8G2 
G0'/,660 
l,G86,319 
1,276,038 
1,431,~~.22 
£19,5::1'7,893 
.6,358,407 
218,586 
12,759 
88,734 
31,832 
138,753 
755,604 
558,955 
£8,163,630 
Population 
124,700 
54,000 
17,550 
9,840 
2,640 
'/, 600 
32,400 
19,350 
' 
267,080 
73,700 
6,810 
6,590 
3,120 
2,300 
5,310 
7,980 
105,830 
Table No. B ••• 7 (continued) 
Christchurch Urban Area 
Christchurch City 
Riccarton Borough 
Lyttelton Borough . 
Pa parua County 
Waimairi County 
Heathcote County 
Halswell County 
Christchurch Transport Board 
Christchurch Drainage Board 
Lyttelton Harbour Board 
Christchurch Lyttelton Road 
Tunnel Authority 
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(as at 31 March 1962) 
Net Debt 
3,456,219 
86,791 
36,525 
201,G47 
{)02 1 2t.J,3 
02,50G 
69'7 1 '708 
4,736,333 
2,607,560 
2,412,330 
£)4,869,642 
Population 
153,500 
7,320 
3,380 
16,500 
1:13,000 
6,·170 
3,220 
233,390 
(Report on the Local Authority 
Statistics of New Zealand -
Department of Statistics) 
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divergence in the sizes of the various authorities making up the 
different urban area. 
Demand: as Between Long Term and Short Term. Capital 
· In some periods long term finance 1. e. say, for terms /of 
twenty five years and upwards, may be more readily obtainable than 
short term ftnanc:e while at other times the converse situation may 
apply. Broadly speaking, however, short term capital is mqre readily 
obtainable than long term finance. 
The Local .Authorities Loam; Board has adopted a policy of 
limiting the loan term to the life of the. asset subject matter of the 
loan. But .in any event it will not, except in very special circum-
stances, grant terms in excess of twenty-five years. These 
circumstances are confined to those cases where a very expensive 
and durable asset is to be constructed. 
Ideally then 1 the authorities would t:refer to place all of their 
issues at the maximum term permitted by the Loans Board but very 
frequently market conditions prevent them from doing this and an 
authority is often forced on to the market with a series of maturities 
carrying different rates of interest. This is designed to catch the 
different classes of lenders some of whom prefer long term, some 
medium 1 and some short. 
Prior to about 1950 the authorities were able to raise most of 
the money they required from the institutions. A few, however, 
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especially th~ larg(!r bodies I explored the open market and more or 
less supceeded .in placing their issues there without excessive ad-
vertising and without the aid of underwriting. About 1950 1 however 
a gradual tightening .of the market set in and this forced many of the 
autho(ities, small.and large alike I on to .th~ open market. This meant 
that many of the smaller authorities were unable to raise finance at all"' 
It also meant that maturit~es of a. much shorter term had to be offered 
and this .in turn gave risE! to still f~rther difficulties. A;~sume that 
' . . 
there are merely two rates of interest operating i.e. a short term 
rate for pe~iods up to five years and a long term rate for terms of five 
years and over. Now. if 1 in such circumstances, a loan is placed 
upo11- the open market in one issu~ the six year maturiti.es w.Ul be sold 
first as that is the shortest term at the .maximum rate;! of interest. 
After the six year maturities all the short term stock will sell and 
after that the maturities of up to ten years. This could mean that, 
. 
after several months of intensive advertising the authorities find 
themselves with a heap of long term maturities upon hand which they 
cannot dispose of. But the Loans Board has taken action to rectify 
this situation and it will generally permit only a certain portion of an 
issue to be sold upon a six year term. At the same time it .has 
permitted the authorities, in certain circumstances 1 to borrow for 
terms longer than the re_payment table of the loan. Thus an authority 
may be permitted to borrow for a term of ten years upon a table of 
repayments based upon a term of twenty years. This means, of 
course, that the loan would have to be refinanced at the termination 
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of ten years by means of a renewal loan. This practice is frequently 
resorted to in those times wheri long term finance is difficult to obtain. 
It has however, many inherent disadvantages, e.g. the necessity to 
raise renewal loans may inhibit the raising of new loans for 
essential construction works and may create artificial surges in the 
market. At the same time there is a tendency for renewal issues to 
be somewhat more difficult to raise than loans for new works becau~e 
as they cannot be associated with some specific project they tend to 
lack 'glamour appeal'. The use of renewal loans' is at its best merely 
a palliative and docs not provide a sound solution to the problem of 
the lack of long term finance. Furthermore the overall financial 
structure of the local authbrity is not designed to borrowing upon short 
term. 
The 1963 Annual Report of the Local Authorities Loans Board 
contained the following comment upon the subject of renewal loans. 
"The easing of the money market noted over the past year has 
undoubtedly benefited those local authorities with major works 
projects under way. In future years, however, the problem of 
raising loan money is likely to be accentuated by the necessity 
of many local authorities to refinance a large portion of maturing 
loans originally raised for six and ten years from 1952 onwards 
but with loan repayments or sinking fund contributions based on 
longer ultimate terms. The next few years should be critical 
ones in this respect. 
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"The financing of these renewal loans is an obligation which 
cannot be evaded and will take precedence over the financing of 
loans for new works. A major problem .is therefore likely to 
arise although it may be offset to some extent by moneys 
available from repayment of loans after any reinvestment by 
holders of maturing loans. These moneys will form a pool 
from which local author.ities will be able to draw .in competition 
with other sections of the capital market. 
The immediate problem, however, will be to obtain sufficient 
money to meet those balances oi the maturing loans which have 
not been reinvested by previous holders and at the same time 
obtain sufficient money to en<)ble the authorities to continue 
with approved capital works." 
The Table No. B ••• 8 sets out the amounts sanctioned for renewal 
loans together with the amount sanctioned for works loans for the 
respective year. We note that in the depression years of the early 
thirties the amounts sanctioned for renewal loans greatly exceeded that 
sanctioned for works loans. This indicates, firstly, the .tack of 
capital formation in those years, secondly, the general paucity of 
finance and thirdly the tendency of investors to invest short term 
rather than tong term. It should be pointed out that relatively heavy 
works expenditure took place in the late twenties and by the early 
thirties there was a need to refinance this expenditure. A somewhat 
analogous situation could well arise in the mid to late nineteen 
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sixties as indicated in the tract from the Loans Board R,eport. 
The Demand for Very Shott Term Finange 
As far,(!s the .demand for very short term finance is concerned 
we once .again see that mark~t condition}? have forced doubtful 
practices upon the authorities.. 13ut the demand for very short term 
finance is really a question of the hypctheGo.tion of debentures. and it 
is this whi.ch must.t:lOW take our att.enttcm. 
The hypothecation of ,debentures is can-ied out in accordance 
with the provisions of section 65 of the: Local Authorities Loans Act 
1956. .In effect it i::; a process whereby an authority is able to 
mortgage debentures and thereby raise finance for a very short term 
before the loan itself iE; raised •. The amount raised by way of hypo-
thecation remains a first charge upon the loan when it is raised. 
Hypothecation finance is generally provided by either the trading 
banks or the National Provident Fund. 
Now in times of market stringency there is a tendency for 
authorities to resort to this type of finance upon an undesirable scale 
and cases have occurred of the instrument of hypothecation being 
renewed, for what at times, amounts to an indefinite period. This 
means that a local authority may be. using say trading bank finance to 
cover the cost of capital works, a situation which most would agree 
is quite undesirable. This condition is somewhat analogous to that 
which has existed in the field of company finance where companies 
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have been forced to resort to overdraft accommodation to carry out 
development works because of the lack of suitable long term finance. 
A further disadvantage of hypothecation is the term aspect in relation 
to the life of the asset. Hypothecation means that the term of the loan 
as sanctioned by the Loans Board is extended by the amount of the 
period oi the hypothecation. Hence it would be possible to have an 
asset with an anticipated life of twenty years the subject of a loan 
of thirty years • 
Although very short term borrowing may be technically undesir-
able there can be no doubt that from a practical point of view it is 
vitally necessary that the power to hypothecate debentures should 
exist. A local authority is frequently called upon to meet expenditure 
at very short notice and may be unable to raise the necessary finance 
upon the market tn the time available .. At the same time the power to 
hypoth~cate tends to put a degree of flexibility into the market as a 
broker is able to make use of the process to tide him over when he 
sees that some suitable long term finance will be available in a few 
monthr; time. 
Although short term borrowing by local authorities may be 
undesirable the same certainly cannot be said of short term lending 
and indeed it is vita.lly necessary that there should be a repository for 
the funds of the authorities which are not immediately required to 
cover payments. A short term money market is especially necessary 
in those times when finance is difficult to obtain when an authority 
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Table No. B ••• 8 
Vlork.s and Redemption Loans Sanctioned 
Year Ended Sanctioned 
31 March Works Redem~tions 
1928 3,212,185 1,048,796 
1929 3,866,551 809,221 
1930 3,563,842 967,875 
1931 1;766,256 838,901 
1932 781,195 2,483,810 
1933 406,521 2,348,231 
~934 917,560 2,744,245 
1935 1,585,440 2,379,955 
1936 1,550,690 . 2,051,790 
1937 2,4J1,358 430,313 
1938 3,098,445 122,758 
1939 3,013,872 1,188,525 
. 1940 1, 701,460 355,800 
1941 2,709,505 1,602,670 
1942 1,898,096 1,391,728 
1943 1,497,120 11 1211000 
1944 1,349,335 2,359,755 
1945 1,137,807 698,120 
1946 2,643,935 243,235 
1947 '7 28:3 436 
. I I . l,lOG,430 
Hl48 f),Q22,08LJ, 1,459,880 
1949 6,977,289 1,542,177 
1950 11,602,220 761,957 
1951 9,?.1!2,938 485,550 
1952 13,891,297 1,029,246 
1953 17,853,560 196,330 
1954 23,982,810 300,204 
1955 25,818,955 448,971 
1956 15,ll62,255 437,400 
1957 17,232,790 30,000 
1958 25,799,656 850,000 
1959 20,537,64G 542,100 
1960 28,972,797 236,800 
1961 34,648,500 474,505 
1962 24,042,760 1,800,580 
1963 25,752,975 3,578,589 
(Annual Reports of the Local Authorities Loans Board) 
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may be compelled to raise funds beyond its immediate needs simply 
because they happen t:o come along with the fear that when it does 
require the capital it may not be able to obtain it .. 
. . 
The Re-organisation of :LQcal,Authorities 
The re-organisation of local authorities would possibly have 
. . 
some effect upon the demand for capital. This matter can be looked at 
'. ! r 
from two distinct angles. ·Firstly there is the problerr1 of the. small 
I . / ' 
local authority which cannot obtain finance. Re-organisation which 
; ' r 
had the effect of eliminating such bodies would, of course, mitigate 
this problem. But to be effective the re-organisation would have to do 
away with virtually all of the' smaller authorities because if a few only 
were amalgamated into larger units the remainder may: be ~ompelled to 
compete for capital against a larger number of bigger auth~rities. 
' ' I ' , 
Seccmdly there is the angle of total demand. Amalgamation could 
probably bring about some decrease in demand from the overall point 
of view. At present many services are duplicated and amalgamation 
could probably prevent such duplication. Examples of this exist in 
,' . I 
such items as administr~tive ,buildings and units of heaVy ·plant 
(which frequently has to'remain tdle for large parts of the year) which 
I > I 
could well serve local authorities many times the size of those which 
they are at present serving without the expenditure of any .'further 
capital. The best example of this exists in the Auckland Urban Area 
where some thirty author.lttes all support their own administration 
72 
buildings. It must be admitted that some attempt has been made to 
pool items of plant sc that they may be more efficiently used, but this 
practice has not yet been catried to any great lengths. A further 
example of duplication is contained in the generation of electricity • 
. Several instances exist of small boroughs, which are completely 
surrounded by power boards, generating their own electricity. 
A larger authority is in a position to let larger contracts and 
can usually effect some saving in this respect. However the use of 
ad-hoc authorities and in particular the Auckland Drainage Board has, 
in some cases, done away with the need for several small bodies to 
each provide themselves with the same service. 
The growth of county towns over the past few years (there are 
now over one hundred of these bodies in New Zealand) has probably 
increased the demand for capital.. Being a legal subdivision a debt 
can be centralised over a county town and many cases exist of county 
towns carrying net debts per head far in excess of those of their 
parent county. The element of local autonomy brought about by the 
assumption of county town status has doubtless resulted in a consider-
able amount of borrowing taking place which would not otherwise have 
occurred. Many county towns are situated on the outskirts of large 
urban areas and have developed along urban lines. Such a situation 
means a greater demand for finance than would be the case if the area 
of the county town had been amalgamated w.ith the urban area. But on 
the other hand some saving of capital may result if some of the smaller 
boroughs assumed the status of county towns. 
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THE SUPPLY OF CAPITAL 
This secUon considers the sources from which the local 
authorities obtain their capita! finance. The lenders of finance to 
local bodies may be divided into three separate groups. On the one 
hand we have the open market, i.e. the small lender~ the elderly 
widow, the family trust, the education trust, or the farmer with a few 
hundred pounds to spare.. Secondly we have the institutions, thE) most 
notable of which are the insurance companies and the trustee savings 
banks. Most of these are under some degree of legislative 
restriction but are generally free to determine their own investment 
policy. Then we have the state lending institutions which play a 
vital role in the field of local body investment. These include the 
State Advances Corporation and the National Provident Fund. The 
investment policy of these institutions is considered in detail in this 
section. 
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These sources of supply are not static I they tend to change. 
over the years. At one point of time the insurance companies may lead 
the field as investors in local authority stock while a few years later 
the small lender may have captured their position. Different factors 
have different effects upon different lenders. Thus trading banks are 
more likely to be affected, as lenders, by economic fluctuations than 
are say, insurance companies. Insurance is now socially and 
economically desirable and persons will take out life and fire 
insurance as a prime necessity in business management and 
irrespective of the prevailing economic conditions. Insurance 
companies also possess an advantage in that they can frequently 
exert pressure upon a potential borrower (especially a house property 
mortgagor) by refusing to lend money unless they have a policy as 
collateral security. In times of market stringency the state lending 
institutions, and especially the National Provident Fund I assume a 
greater degree of importance. The National Provident Fund is to a 
large extent a lender of last resort. 
It has been stated elsewhere that the authorities prefer to 
raise loans with an amortisation period as long as possible so that 
the annual repayments may be kept as low as possible. Although this 
is the case as far as demand for capital is concerned when we come 
to consider the supply of capital it is desirable to have loans upon as 
short an amortisation period as possible. 
"The Board also wishes to draw the attention of local 
bodies to the desirability 1 under present conditions, 
of shorten~ng the amortisation period for their loans 
wherever possible. By so doing they will help to swell 
the volume of money becoming available from their 
maturing debentures or their sinking fund contributions 
for reinvestment in new projects." 
(Annual Report of the Local Authorities Loans Board) 
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It is possible to visualise a permanent 'pool' of funds being 
established'into which would be paid all local authority loan 
repayments and from which the authorities would draw when they 
required money. Such a 'pool' 1 to borrow a term from the natural 
sciences 1 would be in a constant state of 'dynamic equilibrium'. 
This state would only be possible if loan repayments were equal 
to or exceeded borrowing and would depend upon the fund being 
reserved exclusively for the use of local authorities. Table No 
C •• 1 shows the amounts uplifted against the amounts repaid. 
In 1953 the difference between the two was about 7. 6 million ; 
in 1958 .the differenc;e was 17,4 million while in '1963 it had risen 
to about 20 million. There is certainly no indication at the present 
time that the annual amount repaid will equate to the annual amount 
uplifted. 
Table :No C,. 2 (part 1) sets out in summary form the sources 
of funds raised. The steadily rising amount that is made available 
by the Nationa 1 Provident Fund is clearly evident while it can be 
seen that the amount that is coming from the State Advances 
Corporation, which is increasingly turning itself into a specialised 
lender 1 is tending to decline. The small lender is retaining a 
pre-eminent position but the insurance companies are also trenqing 
down while local authority investment in the issues of other local 
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Table No C •• 1 
Amounts Uplifted As Against Amounts Repaid 
' ' ' . ' . . . ' . ' 
£millions 
Year Amount uplifted Amount repaid 
1953 11.6 4.0 
1954 16.6 4.7 
1955 12.8 5.5 
1956 15.0 5.1 
1957 20.4 6.6 
1958 24.4 7.0 
1959 2'!..7 7.4 
1960 30.0 8.6 
1961 26.9 8.7 
1962 21.1 10.0 
1963 29.4 * 9.5 * 
*estimate only 
(The above table was compiled 
from figures contained in the 
Report on the Loca 1 Authority 
Statistics of New Zealand -
Department of Statistics; and 
the 1963 Report of the Local 
Authorities Loans Board). 
authorities is remaining fairly constant. Other sources 
contribute little and are likely to remain small investors in 
the local authority sector. Thus we could summarise by 
saying that insurance companies and the other institutions, 
excluding the National Provident Fund, are declining as 
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investors in this sector while the gap is being filled by increased 
investment from the National Provident Fund and the private 
investor. 
·Parts 2 to 8 of Table No C & .2 show an interesting set 
. of figures. They are, however 1 of limited value because they 
refer only to one quarter of one. year. T..ater and more broadly 
based figures along the same lines have not been prepared and 
the figures shown seem to have been drawn up specifically for 
the use of the Royal Commisston on Local Authority Finance. 
These· tables are designed to show differences in the sources 
of supply as between authoriUes of differing sj.zes. 
Looking at the figures shown for counties we find a 
number of significant features.. Dne feature is the relatively 
small amount raised by counties as compared with other 
authorities. We see that counties with incomes between 
£ lOO ,.000 and £2 00,000 raised an amount of £142,000 out of a 
total amount raised by counties of £328,000 but the great bulk 
of the counties would fall into this income group. Counties 
with incomes of less than £50,000 obtained 33% of the total 
amount that they raised from the State Advances Corporation; 
counties in the next wealthiest groups raised 8%, 32% and 16% 
respectively of the total amounts that they raised from this 
source, while counties overall gained 21% of the total amount 
that they raised from this source • The bulk of this finance 
would have been supplied for rural housing purposes which is 
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a fairly prevailent item of expenditure especially amorig the 
smaller more rural counties. Finance for this purpose is made 
available by the State Advances Corporation at a reduced rate 
of interest. 
Percentages of total amounts raised from the' National 
Provide.nt Fund show a· steady trend downward as the counties 
increase in size~ thus 44%, 31%, 27%, and 7% respectively. 
We note that there is a similar trend in th8 figures for 
boroughs and power boards • ·· Harbour boards raised nothing : 
at all from this source while hosPital boards raised very little. 
' . . 
This demonstrates fairly decisively the National Provident 
Fund's role as a lender of last resort, assisting those 
authorities which are unable to raise finance from other sources. 
Hospital boards were successful fu raising a substantial 
portion of their finance from private investors but harbour and 
power boards also obtained a fair portion of their borrowings 
from this source. This tends to indicate the 'glamour appeal• 
attached to these authorities. l.t is seen that the larger 
harbour boards tended to gain a greater portion from insurance 
companies while the smaller boards tended to get more from 
private investors. This is probably accounted for by a few 
very large issues from the major boards which were too big to 
be floated upon the open market. In the case of power boards 
the portion obtained from private investors increased as the 
power boards increased in size • 
We must now go on to consider in more detail the various 
sources from which the authorities obtain their ,_funds and this 
will in~olve a study of each source in turn. 
THE SOURCES OF FUNDS RAISED 
Source of Funds 
State Advances Corporation 
Nationa 1 Provident Fund 
Insurance Companies and 
Other Institutions 
Other Companies 
Private InvestoJ:"s 
Local Authority Fund 
Other Sources 
£millions 
Table No C ... 2. (part 1) 
£millions 
Amount Raisqd to 31 1v'iarch 
19'60 1961 
2.01 1.79 
2~87 3.95 
9.73 9.50 
1.77 1.11 
11.98 8.53 
1.02 1.24 
0.78 1.03 
30.16 27.15 
1962 1963 
0 .. 62 0.93 
4.27 6.A4 
3~96 4.92 
0 .~10 1.28 
3.83 14.79 
1.67 1.36 
0.50 0.45 
20.25 30.17 
(Annud Reports of the Local Authorities 
Loans Board 1963). 
-....1 
c..o 
AXJ~LYSIS GF LOANS P..AISED BY LOCAL A\J7HCRI1'IES 
:CURING SEPTEr.mER_QUAFcTE:.:\. 1957 
l. Lccal .4.:J.ti:'lClr~ties ":'lith annua! r8v&nues UT1.der £5 Q, DGG (exciudi;::g cap:i.tal receip·cs). 
Source c£ ?:J.:.-ds Bcrrc-;:Vin;:j Authvrit:;; 
Counties B,)r'.>ughs Pm\'er Earbo:J.r E)spital Fire 
Boards Bc.;:;_rds B:::;::~rds Boards 
State Advances C~Jn. .·· ~:~~ " ~ 10 0 l.;) 
Nati0nal PrGvident Fd.. 3 137 ·~, 
"'"' 
7 
Insurance Cc:rs • etc.* 3 'j~ ,.,., lO 57 
Private Investors ;: l 35 1 
Total for (>Jarter 18 ~52 4:8 1 10 84 
*Includes savings banks, trust companies, buHdir1g s.-..;cieties and tradii1g banks. 
" Includes scme· public iss·.1es where sources were not sh.::..,,vn. 
Table No. C •• 2. (part 2) 
(£0GC) 
Other 'I'ot;sl 
2 ":-~ I _, 
32 2P~ 0/ 
117 
87 
34 s~~7 
oc 
0 
2. Local Author~·ties ·wtth Annu':!i Revenues bstween £5 C:, D ~ :: 3.:-:d £:00 ,.COO (excludin:;:~ ca ::·ita1 receipts) 
Source of Fur~ds 
State .Adv.::mces Corpcration 
-·-'"1 
Local Authorities 
National PW\'ident Fund 
Insurance C ::;:n ()c.nie s * 
Cther Gem p::u.ies 
Private Inve;;'tors ;; 
Other sources 
Total f: r C>_:3ri:er 
Br:·rrov.rinq Authcri!Y 
Counties Bcrouahs Pc;:--,r.rer Boards · 
G 
..... 
" . :· 
~ ,-. 
.. ' · ..
~ r· 
:..:':·-=-
·; i 
95: 
!.\ s~ 
~2 55 
7J~\ 
~i: 
n E 
185 01 
'~' Includes savings banks, trust cGmpo:-:..ies, buHding societiE<.;, and tr::ding banks. 
" Includes sorr,e public issues where so;:tJ:css ·:,.;sre net kr:(;;c· . .~.;.. 
m bl '?IT .-, ? (p r··· "') 
.J.a ... eJ. .. o.v •• ~. :::11.0 
Tctal 
56 
.... 
,) 
1,.,.., ~' 
i 1~5 
!..;.-:_ 
29 
9 
341 
(!,~000) 
00 
..... 
3. Local .?'.uthorities with Annual .Revenu3s }~;;tv•JeeE £1 GG. C0D 2:-:.d Z2 JO, GOO 
Source of :Funds 
State Advances Coq:m. 
Local Authoriti-~s 
National Provident Fund 
Insurance Ccmpc•rlies* 
Cther Ccrrpc::-ties 
Private Inves-~:~rs " 
Other Sources 
Total fer Quarter 
Borro·.;v-in;; Authcrity 
C.:mnt~es B::r::m~:hs Pcvver Ea.rh::ur Hospital Total· 
11~ 6 
s: 
39 87 
55 
~;8 52 
1.:.~2 IS-4 
Boards Beards Beard;:; 
15 
47 
53-
115 
35 
2 
193 
1 ·~· 
.L,' 
2~} 7 
95 
14 
109 
9G 
9 
126 
197 
2 
360 
17 
8.07 
~·~ Includes scvi.ngs banks, trust comp5::-rL-es .- buHdtng s0cietiE:s, and trading banks. 
" Includes so::Ee publtc issues v1here souroe-:; were not sho~.•T?l. 
Table No .. C •• 2. {part 4) 
(£000) 
0:1 
N 
4. Local Authorities with Annual Revenues between £2Qi) ¥000 and £500,000 (excluding capital receipts) 
Source of Funds Borrowing Authorities (£000) 
Counties Boroughs Bridge Athy. & PatNer Harbour Hospital Total 
Urban Drainage- Boards Boards Boards 
State Advances Corpn. 
Local Authcrit1.es 
National Provldent Fund 
Insurance C~;mpanies etc. * 
Other C::-Jmpanies 
Private Investors 
Cther Sources 
'rota.l zc:r ~uarter 
12 
., 
.... 
43 
s 
72. 
11 
1 
1 
6·~. 
~ -, J. .:.,~. 
l s::-~ ~"'.:::.. 
2{0 
Boards 
C22 
tl? 
2~;( 
E 
1 ,. C23 
13 
2 
45 
?5 
2ll 
!:12 
23 
285 
51 
, .-r,~ 
J-.:..V 
1L~2 
339 
·.~ Inc·!udes :::a-v-~ngs ba .. 1ks, tr:J.st cG<l~iP2~,~~Gs, b'.1ildc~~1g societies and ·~racling ban!~s. 
" Includes sorr:e !:)ublic issues 1:vhere sourc.;o;s 'Nere not shewn. 
. """ 
.t:....: 
~- E 
1 ,.. ·, 
,!.(,...>....., 
:.2 ~~ 
41 
32 
58 
l/:)72: 
J32 
1,036 
152 
2 1522. 
(:i:-Jote for convenience the urban drainage boards have been included in this sectio:1.; their 1955-56 
revenues ranged from £500 to £35G, 000.) 
Table No. C •• z. (part 5) 
00 
w 
5 ..,.. -J-l , __ ·t1 ..... ..,!.J~.;,.... .... - -~,t.." .,,..... ~ l •~-.... --. ..... ...,.., ~ """"- ~ , ... __ _,. ____ ~[_·.···:,...! ·""'· . -.. -._ 1 't"Y _ _,,- ~· --- ·.~.. 1 e· · -,.,.. )-• ~C:~c!._ .. ~~ 1'-IL:...:.c"' !hL;l .·>unUd .:lc\:cu_,_,SS '"'XveeCllfL·O:: !.·~''-''', ~ ,_.,_ ~e .. -.;.....:ct':G.li'll,;) v.at=:ld\ ... r -Ce:q .. , .. S 
Sour;;e ::f Fund;,; 
State J.'~,:;<vc:=~~:.::es C.:;q:n. 
Loca 1Auth:r.:tie s 
1-Iational Prcwident Fu:>:d 
L!su.rance Ccr!:Dc::Jies ··" 
Other Ccr,'lp3ni'cS 
Priv2te Invest: . .cs "' 
C-::her Sou.r:;es 
Total fer C u::u·ts1· 
Borro\f~Ti::~ 1\_:_r:l1crit ~_e s 
- -r.-:.orcu.£;~,'3 Pc:.~r-.'f'er Earbcur Ecs ;:itd Urban 
23 
l77 
22 
5 ::<:: 
,-.,.... 
() ·.:; 
t;73 
·- -!_'. 
1~.2<~-5 
Bcc,.rds B;::ard:3 
3 
so 
50 
l 
253 
L) 
(22 
2G 
') () ; 
~ UJ. 
SJ. 
r-. r:: rJ 
.,,,£., 
Bc::~r.c:.s Transport 
Boards 
15 
21 1Ct 
[! 
':: '7 c 
·-· r ·:,_, 41 
,., .. 
;) ~ 
~:42 51 
~-. In~l:1des sc:\:::.~:.gE' canks, trust ccr:::;;::.Ir.ies .- buHd-..:ng sccict~;;;s, :xnd trading banks 
1 ~ Inclt..:.des sc.:!.'le pu.l:ilic .:ssuE:s v.:-l1er,:2. :::~.:.::J.z··;::;ss ·:;}(~rs· J.1c:·~ shc-~;r:::. 
Table N·o. C •• 2. {p::1ri: 5) 
(£00J) 
Tota.l 
?r:. 
~ .... 
205 
127 
9Q!~: 
71 
1 !C''7 ,-_...;.~' 
85 
2 1-613 
00 
,c:::. 
6. All Local Authorities. 
Source of Funds 
State Advances Corporation 
Local Authorities 
National Provident Fund 
Insurance Companies etc. * 
Other Companies 
Private Investors n 
Other Sources 
Total for Quarter 
Counties 
71 
12 
82 
94 
69 
328 
Borrowing Authorities 
Boroughs 
128 
179 
339 
758 
87 
781 
53 
2,325 
Power 
Boards 
47 
11 
223 
142 
1 
622 
10 
1,056 
Harbour 
Boards 
35 
48 
566 
53 
377 
159 
1,238 
Hospital 
s·oa:rds--
15 
136 
18 
489 
31 
689 
*Includes savings banks, trust companies I building societies, and trading banks. 
"Includes some public issues where sources were not known. 
Table No. C •• 2. (part 7) 
(£000) 
(X) 
en 
6. All Local Authorities (continued) 
Source of Funds Borrowing Authorities 
Fire Boards Bridge Authy • & Urban Other 
Urban Drainage Transport 
Boards Boards 
State Advances Corporation 10 2 
Local Authorities 
National Provident Fund 7 7 32 
Insurance Companies etc .. * 67 631 10 
Other Companies 47 
Private Investors " 332 41 
Other Sources 10 
Total for Quarter 84 1,027 51 34 
* Includes savings banks, trust companies, building societies, and trading bariks 
"Includes some public issues where sources were not shown. 
Table No. C •• 2. (part 7) - continued 
(£000) 
Total 
293 
250 
705 
.· 2 ,.404 
208 
2,711 
261 
6,831 
(X) 
en 
7. The total distribution according to size of local authority of the funds raised from each source was~ ; • 
Size of Authority by Revenue 
1. £0- £501000 
2 • £50,000 - £1001000 
3. £100,000- £200f000 
4. £200,000- £500,000* 
5. Over £500,000 
State 
Advances 
Corporation 
76 
56 
96 
41 
25 
293 
Local 
Authorities 
3 
9 
32 
205 
250 
National 
Provident 
267 
127 
126 
58 
127 
705 
Sub~ total 
343 
186 
230 
131 
357 
1,248 
*Harbour Bridge Authority and urban drainage authorities included here for convenience. 
Table No. C., 2. (part 8) 
co 
'.1 
7 ~ · The, total distribution according to size of local authority of the 
funds raised from each source was ••• (continued) 
Size of Authotity by Revenue Insurance Other 
Com Jianies etc.* ComQanies 
1. £0 - £.501 000 117 
2. £501000 - £1001000 113 4 
3. £100,000- £200,000 197 2 
4. £200,000- £SOOJOOO 1,073 132 
5. Over £500,000 904 71 
2,404 208 
Private Other 
Investors 11 . SOurces. 
87 
29 9 
360 17 
1,036 . 152 
1,197 85 
2,711 261 
* Includes savings banks, trust companies, building societies, and trading banks. 
11 Includes some public issues where source was not shown. 
' Harbour Bridge Authority and urban drainage authorities included here for convenience. 
Total 
547 
341 
807 
. 2,523 
:2,613 
6,831 
(Parts 2 to 8 of Table No .. ·C ... 2 were taken 
from the Report of the Royal Commission 
on Local Authority Finance.) 
Table No. C •• 2. (part 8}- continued CD 
co 
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The Small Lender 
The small lender has retained his pre-eminent position as a 
contributor· to local authority stock and in the year ended 31 March 
1963 he contributed some 49% of the total amount raised. The other 
parts of Tabl~ .No. C •. 2 show the di atribution ef the small lender • s 
contribution in·the September Quarter 19.57. Boroughs, power boards 
and hospital boards obtained more finance from the sm,alllender than 
from any other source in this period and the larger auth6rities tended 
to obtain a<greaterproportion of their finance from this source than 
did the smaller bodies. This latter point is piobably accounted for by 
the fact that the larger authorities would have more reason to resort to 
publi.c issues than the smaller bodies and would tend to be more 
successful at raising money on public issue. Unfortunately no figures 
are .available .which set out the sources of loan finance as between 
rural· and urban authorities. It is probable, hoW"ever, that such 
figures would show that as far as the smaller authorities are con-
cerned it would be mainly rural bodies who drew finance from the 
small lender. As stated earlier many of the smaller authorities in the 
larger urban areas are fo~ced to resort to the institutions to obtain 
finance because of opposition from the larger authorities. 
In many respects the · private investor does not represent a very 
satisfactory source ot funds~ Most of the finance contributed by the 
small lender comes from certain fairly well defined groups. The 
farming community provides a considerable amount of finance to the 
90 
smaller counties and would doubtless figure large in the lending to 
the power boards (which are essentially rural) and ·possibly to the 
·harbour boards~· Being authorised trustee investments local 
authority loans attract a considerable amount of finance from such 
things as family trusts and education foundations. Included am~ng 
the· private investors would be investment' from many different chibs 
and sooieties, e.g .. the· New Zealand Rugby Union has made some 
finance c available for the purpose of erecting grandstands and setting 
out sports grounds~ Quite a number of small investors prefer to 
purchase stock upon the stock exchange rather than invest in an 
initiai issue~ This c~m have the double advantage 'in that it may 
mean a shorter maturity periOd together with (~n some instances) 
a higher return. This could be the case in ti11es of great market 
stringency when difficulty is experienced in dis posing of stock a~d 
sellers are prepared to unload at a considerable discount. But so~e 
institutions prefer to invest in initial issues merely to assist the 
authorities even when they could obtain a higher return by purchasing 
old securities • 
One of the major disadvantages of the small investor from the 
point of view of the local authority is that generally, he is able to 
place only a very small amount in an issue and this tends to add 
somewhat to the administrative expenses involved in the issue. At 
the same time the open market means that expenditure will be involved 
in advertising but at the same time expenditure by way of procuration 
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fees will be saved. But the biggest problem associated with raising money 
from the small investor is the tenn aspect. A small lender does not usually 
like to have his finance tied up for lengthy periods of time. Thus he will 
attempt to invest for as short a term as possible but at the same time to 
obtain the highest possible return. A corporation, on the other hand, has 
perpetual existence and does not have to be concerned with any difficulties 
which might a~ise in respect to the liquidation of long tenn investments 
upon the death of the investor. 
But a further feature associated with the small lender is that he is 
not spread evenly throughout the country. A local authority in the Auckland 
or Wellington areas would probably experience considerable difficulty in 
raising finance from this source while a small borough set in a farming 
district, a rural power board, or a backwoods county would find that it 
could raise quite a steady amount from the small lender. In considering 
investment by institutions the geographical location of the borrower is not 
generally an important matter but the small lender is at his best in those 
districts where the level of individual income is higher than the national 
average. Table No. C •• 2 tends to confirm this contention. From part 7 of 
the Table we can calculate the amount raised from various sources as a 
percentage of the total amount raised for each of the various classes of 
authorities. We see that the hospital boards which are a combination of 
rural and urban bodies lead the field with 70,9% of the total amount raised 
coming from the small investor. They are followed by the electric power 
boards with a total of 58.9% raised from this source. Power Boards are 
essentially rural authorities. 
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The large amount raised from the small lender by the hospital 
boards leads us to a further interesting characteristic of the private 
investor and that is his subjection to 'glamour appeal'. A small 
lender is swayed by the thought of a new library or town hall while 
the prospect of a new sewerage system will hardly excite him at all~ 
The security backing of a 'loan for sewerage works would of course be 
no different from that for any other loan. An institution is not subject 
to pressures of this nature. 
Local ·patriotism is a feature of the private investor. Provided 
the investment opportunities are offering there he will tend to place 
funds in the area where he resides or where the bulk of his assets or 
interests are situated.. Once again the institution is free from this 
characteristic. The trustee savings banks are local institutions and 
they certainly invest the bulk of the funds that they have available 
in their own areas; this indeed has been one of the major arguments 
advanced by those seeking to get these institutions established in 
the smaller areas. On the other hand the insurance companies place 
their investments upon a nation wide basis. Most of the investment 
policy of the individual insurance companies is directed from their 
Head Offices the bulk of which are situated in Wellington. but their 
investments are not by any means limited to the localities tn which 
their offices are situated. The National Provident Fund and the' 
State Advances Corporation also operate upon a nation wide basis. 
It should be pointed out that institutions are subject to some dis-
advantages not possessed by the small investor e.g. many insurance 
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companies prefer to place their funds into the avenues from which 
they obtain their business. This applies alsof although to a much 
lesser extentf to the National Provident Fund. Some institutions, 
e.g. the State Advances Corporation, will only lend money for certain 
set classes of projects. 
As a large proportion of the funds contributed by the small 
lender are derived from the farming community this source of finance 
is likely to be very sensitive to changes in the prices paid for fann 
produCts. Insurance on the other hand is an economic and social 
necessity and people will tend to insure despite the state of the 
economic barometer. Thus insurance companies tend to be somewhat 
more immune to fluctuations in income than is the small investor. At 
the same tlme .institutions such as the National Provident Fund and 
the State Advances Corporation, which are subject to Government 
control, can frequently operate against the market trends and thus 
help to iron out fluctuations.. The small investor is of little value in 
this respect. 
Local Authority Fund 
The local authority fund figures show the volume of finance 
contributed to local authority loans by other local authorities, i.e. 
inter authority lending, This is carried out at present upon a fairly 
limited scale and in most cases the lender is concerned with 
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investment mainly for the purpose of building up such things as 
depreciation and renewal funds. In some res peats the practice of 
one authority investing in the stock of another is not to be commended 
because if it was carried out upon anything like a widespread scale 
it would mean that large amounts of local authority debt were secured 
merely upon the rating potential of other local authorities .. 
In the case of territorial authorities general rating revenue is 
assessed merely to cover the estimated expenditure of the particthr 
authority for the year in question and a local authority could not 
collect rates simply for the purpose of investing the money. ln 
respect of the trading undertakings (e.g. electrical works) of the 
territorial authorities it is necessary to provide for the depreciation 
and renewal of assets and to this end sections 133 and 140 of the 
Municipal Corporations Act 1954 enable the establishment of 
depreciation and reserve funds for each such undertaking. Sections 
128 and 129 of the same Act enable a municipality to set up fire and 
accident insurance funds and grant a general power to invest the 
funds. This would almost certainly give local authorities the power 
to invest these moneys .in local authority stock. 
In the case of the revenue producing authorities the scope for 
the general investment of surplus funds is much wider. Thus for 
example section 53 of the Harbours Act 1950 grants to harbour boards 
a general powet to invest trading profits and analogous powers have 
been granted to power boards • 
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At the present time this source of funds is very limited but as 
the major revenue producing authorities work off their present debt 
they should have increasing amounts available for investment and 
large amounts of this wUl doubtless go into the debenture and stock 
of other local authorities. Unlike the territorial authorities which are 
forced to rely mainly upon rating income there is virtually no limit to 
the profit which a trading authority can make and it is quite likely that 
in the near future we will see an increasing volume of finance flowing 
from the trading authorities to the territorial authorities.. This could 
mean that other sources of funds which at present supply local 
authorities could be left free to invest their money in other sectors of 
the market. 
It would be possible for a territorial authority to invest profits 
from its trading undertakings in its owndebentures which had been 
issued for a loan for a general purpose, i.e. a purpose not connected 
with the particular trading undertaking. This would mean that the 
investments of the trading undertaking would be secured upon the 
rating potential of the same local authority. This situation would be 
even more undesirable than a territorial authority investing in the 
loan issues of another territorial authority. 
The National Provident Fund 
The National Provident Fund plays a vital and unique role in 
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the field of local authority lendtng.. Although ostensibly an 
1ndepen<i~I1t insti~ution, establishedunder its own.empowering act 
I ' ' ' ' 
it is, in .poir1t of f~ct, .very subject to Government policy and as such 
~s ip a positionto cut across normal lending trends and to act as a 
. . ' ' . . ' 
lend~ of)ast resort. 
T~e Fund was established it) 1911 with a .dual purpose, ·i.e. to 
- ' "' 
proyide pensions and subsidiary ~nefits for members of the general 
public and to provide superannuation schemes for members of local 
authorities and other statutory bodies. The Fund is administered by a 
Board comprising the Minister of Finance as chairman and six other 
members. The present legislative authority is to be found in the 
National Provident Fund Act 1950, section 6 of which enables the Fund 
to invest in local authority .securities. Section 6 of the 1955 Amend---
ment Act empowers th~ Fund to act as sinking fund commissioners to 
local authorities •. The first few sections of the .1955 Act are also of 
vital im porta nee to us as they. establ.ish the local authority .investment 
'pool' which- enables authorities to invest, upon short term, those 
funds which they do not immediately require, e.g. su~plus loan moneys. 
This institution of the Fund has developed into a vital component of 
the local authority capital market. 
The investment policy of the Fund is determined by a committee 
of the Board known as the investment committee .. The activities of the 
committee initially determine the flow of funds from the Fund to the 
local authorities. The moneys available for the Fund for investment 
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are derived from its general superannuation act1.vitles as well as from 
the contributions to the 'pool account'. 
The lending of the 'pool accou..rtt' funds have presented the 
investment C•::lmmittee with a number of problems, Table No, C ~. 3 
(p.:~rt 1) shows the composition ard growth of the 'pool' over the years 
since its establishment in 1956. It can be seen that 'surplus loan 
and miscellaneous moneys' amount to more than one half of to~al 
investmeats in the 'pool', . Depreciatton fund, sinking fund, and 
reserve fund moneys, are in general invested with the Fund upon a 
more permanent basis than are surplus loan moneys and may therefore 
be let out to local authorities for fairly long terms. But surplus loan 
moneys are frequently invested at call and are liable for heavy rep:ly-
ments in accordance with the constructional progress of the varlous 
loan projects. For this reason it is necessary for the Fund to invest 
the bulk of these moneys in readily negotiable short term securities~ 
In 1962 there were some four hundred local authorities contributing to 
the 'pool t and the Fund makes a careful inspection of the accounts of 
all local authorities with the object of ascertaining whether they have 
any surplus funds (e.g. deposits with the Post Office Savings Bank) 
which could be diverted to the 'pooP. The sinking fund activity of the 
Fund is also increasing and as at the 31 March 1962 the Board had 
been appointed the sole commissioner of 436 di.fferent sinking funds 
securing the repayment of loans totalling £14.9 million. 
The investment policy of the Fund is perhaps best summarised 
Table No. C •• 3 {part 1) 
The Growth and Composition of the Nattonal Provident Fund 
Local Authority Pool Account 1956-63 
1956 
Depreciation Funds 108,163 
Sinking Funds 39,515 
Reserve Funds 1,231,667 
Loan & Miscellaneous 
Moneys 2,063,554 
£ 3,442,899 
1958 1961 1962 1963 
306/595 497,431 .58{) 1043 658,838 
209,220 905,708 1,414,762 2,092,323 
2,868,411 9,627,493 11,628,585 17,010,931 
4,756,662 1D,326,887 91815,459 16,657,80~ 
-
81140,888 21,357 ,. 519 23 ,438.,.849 3,5 1 419 1 8 9 6 
{Annual Reports of the National Provident 
Fund Board 1956-63) 
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Table No. c .. 3 (part 2) 
Activities of the National Provident Fund Investment 
Committee for the Year Ended 31 March 1963 
Cities·and Boroughs 
Counties 
Electric Power Boards 
Fire Boards 
Harbouc Boards 
Hospital Boards 
Others 
Number of 
Applications 
135 
60 
19 
8 
13 
13 
18 
-
266 
___;_ 
Amount 
applied for 
5,697,685 
1#842,800 
588,680 
71 I 90D 
1,726,940 
1,227,370 
649,750 
£11,805,125 
Amount 
·approved 
3,1711755 
1,747,300 
518,630 
69,450 
1,529,410 
1,052,370 
324,750 
-
£8 ,·413" 715 
(Annual Report of the National Provident 
Fund Board 1963) 
1.0 
tO 
Tttble No. C •• 3 (part 3) 
Investments of the National Provident Fund in 
Local Authorities Securities 1958-1963 
1958 
1960 
1961 
1962 
1963 
Table No. c •• 4 
£18,461,888 
21,156,241 
23,505,052 
28~236,439 
331297,.838 
(Annual Balance Sheets of the 
National Provident Fund Board) 
Advances upon Hypothecation made by the 
. , National Provident Fund Board 
19.58 
1961 
1962 
1963 
£397,000 
260,000 
432,200 
690,000 
100 
(Annual Reports of the National 
Provident Fund Board 1958-1963) 
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in the following words taken from the 1958 Annual Report of the 
Fund-
"With loan applications far exceeding moneys available for 
lending it has been necessary for the committee to give 
preference to higher priority projects and in some degree 
to differentiate in favour of minor local authorities. Projects 
financed during the year cover a very wide field and include. 
sewerage, drainage, water and electrical reticulation, streets 
and roads, housing and buildings, etc. " 
The investment committee therefore tends to accord preference to those 
authorities who have urgent and necessary works to carry out and who 
are not able to obtain the necessary finance themselves from other 
sources.. This includes I of course I generally, the smaller 
authorities. Reference to Table No. C •• 2 will show the extent to 
which the Fund has been successful in implementing this policy. 
There is also evidence to the effect that some preference has 
been accorded to authorities who support the 'pool'. The following 
statement appeared in the 1962 Annual Report of the Fund -
"With loan applications exceeding moneys available for 
lending it was still necessary for the committee to adopt 
some measure of priority which was generally in the order of 
necessity of loan project, ability of the local authority to 
raise its own finance, and the degree of its investment support 
to the pool. " 
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It appears that some of the larger authorities which are generally 
fairly successful upon the market make a point of investing available 
moneys with the Fund because they know that the Fund will then be 
more likely to take up the few maturities which they are not able to 
dispose of upon the open market. These are frequently those 
maturities for the year just below that at which a higher interest rate 
sets in. Thus the Fund effectively fulfills the function of a lender of 
last resort in that it takes up in full the issues of the smaller bodies 
who are unable to sell upon the open market while at the same time it 
takes up the unsold maturities of the larger who have succeeded in 
selling the rest of the issue upon the open market. 
Insurance ComP?nies 
The insurance companies occupy a crucial position in the 
capital market. It is not possible to examine satisfactorily the 
investment policy of insurance companies in respect to local 
authorities without possessing at least some knowledge of their 
general investment policy. The bulk of these compa!lies are based 
overseas and many of them retain only branch offices in New Zealand. 
Some of the larger companies possess assets worth hundreds of 
millions of pounds. 
A major factor in the investment policy of the life companies is 
that they do not suffer to any great degree the fluctuating liquidy 
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problems which have to be faced by other financial institutions e.g. 
trading banks. In any sophisticated society insurance# even when a 
state of economic depression prevails I is now a social and economic 
necessity and this fact together with the constant maturing of past 
investments has ensured a stea~y flow of funds into the life companies. 
In view of thisthere is no definite reason why the life companies should 
be concerned about retaining large cash reserves and this has meant 
that the companies tend to invest long tenn. But, as with other 
investors I the rate of interest is a fairly dominant factor in determining 
the period of investment. If the companies are of the opinion that the 
rate on local authority stock is at its maximum t~ey will , of course, 
invest long term. If, however, they believe that the interest rate will 
trend upward they will tend to invest short term or place their funds 
into some other short tenn investments apart from local authority 
securities. But in general their investment in local authority stock 
has tended tp be long tenn investment. 
Another factor which has exerted some influence in insurance 
company investment has been the desire to retain custom meaning that 
companies will tend to invest with those authorities which do business 
with them. This used to be especially applicable when the life 
companies operated staff superannuation schemes for various local 
authorities but these schemes are now generally run with the National 
Provident Fund. However, there is still a tendency for the fire 
insurance companies to place their investments with those authorities 
which do their fire insurance with them • 
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It appears that direct pressure from the Government has 
maintained a fairly steady stream of investment in Government 
securities and it is possible that this has inhibited somewhat the 
abUity of the companies to place their funds in local authority stock. 
Insurance companies have made much of the 'public interest' 
aspect of their investment. They point out that they frequently place 
their funds in the manner that will best assist the national economy or 
the welfare of some local community. It is possible that these 
altruistic motives may have induced some investment in Government 
stock and perhaps house mortgages but it is ,very difficult to obtain 
specific examples of companies investing in local authority 
securities for no other reason than that that particular placement 
would assist the national economy or be of benefit to the local 
community. 
ln their investment patt~rnthe companies exhibit the concept of 
the 'portfolio of securities' i.e. they attempt to maintain a range of 
investments extending from the traditional strictly gilt edged through 
real property mortgages to company debentures, convertible notes and 
loans against life interests. An examination of the balance sheet of 
any substantial life compan)r almoo t invariably shows the familiar 
pattern of investment. The following is the investment range of the 
'Provident Life Insurance Company' taken from that company's 1958 
balance sheet.. This Company is incorporated in New Zealand .• 
Government Stock £1,039,658 
Local Authortty Stock· 
Company Debentures 
~egistered Unsecured Notes 
Company Shares 
Loans on Mortgage 
Loans· on: Policies 
Loans on Life Interes~ 
£1,872,645 
410,670 
23,647 
231,255 
1,494,134 
185,618 
3,645 
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But what determines the form of this 'portfolio oflnvestment'? 
The broad framework is set by the traditional investor's policy of 
maintaining the. maximum of security with the maximum of income. 
Long periods of infla~ion and a cheap money policy have had the 
effect of encouraging the companies to shift from the gilt edged into 
the higher yiel4 and capital gain class of .investment and also into 
real estate. The post. war yec;trs therefore have seen a steady trend 
away from the gilt edged investment and in this respect the local 
authorities have suffered somewhat more than the Government because 
they are not in the same position to exert pressure upon the companies. 
Table No. 0 •• 5 sets out this position. But although the companies 
would like to invest less of their current funds in local authority stock 
the indications are that they would not like. to see this type of security 
deleteci entirely from their balance sheets. Over the war years the 
amounts held in gilt edged as a percentage of total investment 
remained at a very high level and this raises the question of investment 
opportunity. Clearly the .major cause of high gilt edged investment in 
those years was lack of qpportunity and a general inability to find other 
more lucrative outlets for the funds. 
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But even if other avenues are available it is still possible that 
opportunity may play a part in directing investment to the gilt edged 
field. In terms of the New Zealand capital market the insurance 
companies are very large institutions and they frequently have falling 
due to them very substantial amounts (sometimes in excess of one 
million pounds) which require to be reinvested. The Government and 
the local authorities provide just about the only outlets in New 
Zealand for sums of this magnitude. It can be realised that if an 
amount of say I one million pounds I falls due to a company it is very 
much to the advantage of that company if it can teinvest that amount 
immediately in one particular issue as the need to break the sum up 
into a number of smaller investments would almost inevitably mean 
greater administrative expenses .. The Government has taken advantage 
of this by making use of conversion loans which enable an investor to 
place his funds back into another Government loan immediately one 
maturity falls due. The frequent use of renewal loans in recent years 
could enable local authorities to take advantage of this point. Just a 
word in pass.ing about administrative expenses; it is of interest to 
note that the expense involved in servicing the various classes of 
investments appears to have been a factor in inducing some of the 
smaller New Zealand companies to retain a greater proportion of their 
investments in government and local authority stock than their bigger 
brothers. It can be realised that in the case, of say I loans on 
mortgage 1 considerable expense is involved in such items as 
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interviewing the applicant investigating the security, correspondence 
and legal fees not to mention the cost of foreclosure, should this be 
necessary. Lending to limited companies can also be expensive as it 
generally involves ex.tensive financial investigation and legal work 
such as the searching of articles of association. On the other hand 
lending to local authorities .is simple and inexpensive as with the use 
of inscribed stock the interest and instalments falling due are 
collected by the Reserve Bank and merely credited to the company's 
account, 
Another point in respect to opportunity is the term aspect. The 
local authorities provide one of the few avenues for very long term 
placements and provided the interest rate is right this is an asset to 
the companies in that it affords them a stable income over a long 
period of time. The issues which have been put on the market with . 
terms in excess of the normal twenty-five years have indeed proved 
fairly popular with insurance companies. Furthennore long term 
investment enables an insurance company to take the procuration fee 
which authorities are permitted to offer as an inducement for placements 
of substantial amounts for lengthy periods. 
In those times when the Loans Board permits underwriting the 
companies rarely deal direct with individual authorities but act as 
sub-underwriters. This means that in return for the payment of part of 
the underwr.iting fee, calculated over the full amount of an issue, an 
insurance company will agree to take up that portion of an issue which 
108 
cannot be disposed of on the open market. This practice has 
assisted in making local authority issues more attractive to the 
companies and indeed this could be looked upon as floating the issue 
at a discount. 
But in spite of the several advantages which local authority 
investment offers to the insurance companies .the higher yield 
security has gained ground and this raises the question of the future 
trend of insurance company investment in the local authority field. 
If present economic trends continue and investment opportunity in· 
other fields remains at a high level it seems probable that the 
percentage of total investment held in local authority stock will 
fall still further, But the need for the com pa.nies to obtain a steady 
income over a long period and thus to hold a stable long term base 
within their portfoltos of investmert will ensure that investment in 
this field does not entirely disappear. Thus the future could see 
insurance company investment in this sector drop still further and 
then remain reasonably constant at some low leveL Whether that 
level would be high enough to supply sufficient long tenn finance to 
the authorities will be dependant upon the trends of future capital 
works. 
It is possible that increased investment from the Government 
insurance offices could at least partially offset decreased investment 
from the other offices. Investment by the Government Life Insurance 
Office in local authority securities over the past few years is as follows 
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(figures taken from the New Zealand Official Year Book 1964 page 
834 - figures are in thousands) 
1959 
1960 
1961 
1962 
1963 
£8,031 
9,099 
10,834 
11,786 
12,220 
It is possible that increased investment from this quarter would not 
come about in the absence of Government d.irection or pressure upon 
the offices concerned i.e. the State Fire Insurance Office and the 
Government Life Insurance Office. 
Insurance company investment is of considerable importance 
to the authorities in that it provides the major source of large and 
long term placements. In some cases, because of long term invest-
ment by insurance companies , an authority which requires a very 
substantial amount for a lengthy period may have more chance of 
raising it than it would of getting a very much smaller amount upon 
the open market. 
Table No. C .• 6 sets out the amounts held as investments in 
local authority stock by the life offices for the years shown. The 
downward trend over the past few years is clearly evident. 
Trustee Savings Banks 
New Zealand is now all but covered by a network of trustee 
Table No. C •• 5 
Life Insurance Companies - LocalAuthority Investment as a 
Percentage of Total Investment 
1938 1946 1950 1961 
Local Authority Securities 36.2 26.70 24.92 17.77 
Government Stock 18,7 42.36 40~05 18.85 
Other Investments 34,1 30.94 34.93 63.38 
1962 '1963 
l5.S4 14.44 
17.87 18,52 
66.19 67.04 
(New Zealand Official Year Book) 
..... 
..... 
0 
Table No. C •• 6 
Amounts Invested by Life Insurance Companies in Local 
Authorities Securities. 
(£000) 
1937 18,201 
1946 21,235 
1950 26,904 
1955 32,332 
1960 40,621 
1961 48,900 
1962 48,199 
1963 47,598 
(New Zealand Official Year Book) 
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savings banks. Many of these have sprung up within the last few 
years. These hls.toric ins~itu~i.ons owe their success largely to the 
fact that they are locally based and sponsored. They possess the 
characteristic that the funds which they have available for investment 
can be invested in the same local district in which the bank operates. 
The banks have therefore been of considerable assistance to the local 
authorities of the areas in which they are situated. The banks have 
been somewhat more successful than their nearest rival, the Post 
Office Savings Bank, in extracting savings from the public. This has 
been brought about by their play upon local interest and the vigorous 
publicity policies which they follow. Several of the early trustee 
banks in New Zealand were forced into liquidation by competition 
from the Post Office Savings but all the banks which are in existence 
at the present time appear to be prospering. 
The Trustee Savings Banks Act 1948 places fairly substantial 
restrictions upon the investment outlets of the banks. The ban)<s have 
been granted a Government guarantee. This has been considered 
necessary to afford the small investors who deposit their savings 
with the banks the maximum of protection. At the same time however, 
the Act requires the banks to retain at least fifty per cent of their 
total investments in Government stock. As the banks become more 
securely established it is reasonable to assume that this requirement 
will be relaxed and this could release a fairly large volume of funds 
for investment in local authority stock. A further point is that at 
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present the Act requires the banks to keep substantial cash 
reserves and the reduction of these could also mean that funds would be 
released for investment 1n the local ·authoritysectoro. Table No. 
C ~ • 7 shows investment by trustee banks in Government stock 
and local authority stoek together with the total amount held in 
investments. Several new .banks have been .established since 
1963. 
State Advan®s CorporatiOI) 
The State Advances Corporation is a publ1c corporation 
operating under the provisions of the State Advances Corporation 
Act 1934-35. In previous times it was a general lending 
agency for local authorities but .this function has sinc;;e been 
taken over by the National Provident Fund and the Corporation's 
activities are now confmed to the lending of finance for housing 
and associated projects. The Act grants the Corporation all 
necessary powers and the Corporation usually lets its finance 
out at a rate of interest somewhat lower tha.n the ruling market 
rate. 
The Corporation lends for clearly defined purposes. 
Pensioner housing projects are a major lending avenue for 
Corporation funds. The local authorities are entitled to a 
subsidy per unit from the Department of Health and the 
Corporation lends the balance of the finance required to 
(£GJ0s) 
Auckland 
v.raikci:'J 
New Plymouth 
Hawkes Bay 
Eokiti.ka 
Canterbury 
Dunedin 
Southland 
Tabl.e No. G •.• 7 
Investments Held by the Truste~ Savings Banks 
Total 
Government 
Stock 
2:•.,595 
2,955 
3;861 
6l6 
359 
1,50·J 
5,371 
5,750 
52,G07 
====="-== 
Figures as at 31 Ma.rch !.963 
Local Authority 
Stcc:k 
7,575 
~:62 
I :J)3 
16 
21 
40 
G49 
2,:317 
11,393 
;:'::====-==== 
Total 
Inve:stments 
61,135 
4,986 
8,580 
709 
8'18 
lj749 
12~213 
12,515 
102,735 
======== 
(New Zealand CfficiP.l Year Book 1963) 
...... 
!.._, 
,1::>. 
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complete the project. The rate at which this money ts made available 
i.s at present (1964) 3!%. 
The Corporation also provides fimm0e for the erection of 
county dwellings, undr?..r the provisions of the Rural Housing Act 19:39. 
Finance for this purpose tr. let out to counttos at a rate ~3t present 
4~;%) aomev,rhat below that ruHng upon the market and the authority 
then relends the money to farmers forth<:; purpose of erecting 
dwellings. 
Community hotwing aod slur11 cloarancH are also within the 
Corporation's a.t::!tivi.Ues but as yet only .Urntted amounts have been 
invested in loans for these purposes. 
lJ§tional Hoads BoRrd 
Section 33 cJ the Nation'il Roads ~.ct 1953 enables the National 
Roads Board to make advances to local authorities for the purpose of 
prov.tding a portion of the cost of construction of works which have 
been subsidised by the Roads Board. 
Advances under this Section are not frequently made and the 
amount outstanding at any one time has never exceeded forty thousand 
pounds. As the maktng of advances under thls Section means less 
finance available for the general activities of the Board only limited 
amounts have been made available. 
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Overseas Borrowing 
Since its establishment in 1926 the Loans Board has adopted 
the policy of requiring all loans to be raised in New Zealand. But 
prior to the establishment of the Board many authorities borrowed 
quite freely overseas, e. g. the Dunedin City Council and the Otago 
Harhour Board. Even some quite small authorities tried their hand at 
bcrrovving in London, c. 1,;;1. the rl/1atamata County in 1922. Since the 
establishment of tho ~~u:.mG Board the total amount of debt domiciled 
outside New ZeaiFn.td [·;<::w steadily declined. Thm; 
£~n) 
1931 
lStW 
1950 
19()0 
1961 
1962 
1963 
London 
17.53 
12.28 
5.03 
1.4 
.7 
.5 
.5 
Australia 
8.57 
2.2G 
.36 
.20 
.20 
.20 
.20 
(.1-"\nnual Reports of the Local Authorities 
Leans Board) 
It seems most unlikely that the New Zealand Government will 
permit local authorities to borrow overseas for some time to come at 
least. The disadvantages of permitting loc-..al authorities to borrow 
overseas may be set out as follows. 
(a) Borrowing on most overseas markets is strictly controlled e.g. 
in the case of the United Kingdom it would be necessary to 
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obtain the approval of the United Kingdom Treasury. A flow of 
applications from local bodies would mean: that some order of 
priority would have to be set. The United Kingdom Treasury 
could not equitably set this and it would have the unenviable 
task of differentiating between the central government and the 
local authorities of one country. As the New Zealand Government 
has itself been a heavy borrower overseas in recent years it 
VlJ(•uld, in eifcct mean that the Government and the local 
a uthorit"ie s ''NGre i.!! cc•r(l rx:tition. 
(b) Servicing lo;:mr; c::rJ overseas markets i.e. arranging brokers and 
undenvriters •.vcnld be very expensive. 
(c) 'l'he individu~1l ot:cthnrities -v-;ould hardly be known to the investors 
upon the ovcrscr1r:: rnarket and it may be very difficult to get the 
issues floated ;J.t pvr. It is of note that in the J 92 Os the loans 
of som~ I\le-vJ ZeaJ.:~nd bodies sold for u.s loN as £90 per £100 of 
face v;:llue of ::;tuck ()H the London market. 
(d) The London market is already· heavily committed and it has been 
called upon in recent years to supply a st0ady How of capital to 
many Comm.omt.realth Countries especially the newly independent 
African States. 
(e) A fair drain upon overseas funds would be necessary to provide 
for the annual servicing of the loans. This could be a problem 
tn those times when there is a downward trend in the level of 
export earnings. 
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(f) A failure by one local authority would tend to bring the New 
Zealand Government into disrepute with the London lender. 
If authorities are to borrow overseas it would be advisable for them to 
borrow through the Government. On the other hand if a local authority 
finance corporation was established in New Zealand this could provide 
a channel through which overseas borrowing could be carried out as 
such an institution would carry much greater weight in an overseas 
market than any indiv.idual authority. 
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THE I' L 0 VIi OF CAPITAL 
The presence c.! .:.:n-1 adeauate st~pply of capital is no guarantee 
thDt the 1.'-1ca l r:mtlwrtt·i_c:::'s vv-.iU, or will aU, be able to borrow sufficient 
c~pital Ior the:ir n1qtd.rcmen.ts as quit8 a par-t fm:ai. the supply of capital 
numerous foro:..:os a£ft::ct the fluw uf fin~:ntc{:J to the local authority 
sector. Opposition upon the market is one such factor that can inhibit 
the flow of capital and this can come from other sectors of thG market 
as welles other locul authorities. It hus long· been an important 
characteristic cf the market that some types of local authorities are 
able to obtain finance vJith much greater ease than others. At the 
same time various devices are sometimes resorted to in order to 
facilitate the flow of capital. Some of these have been specifically 
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authorised by the Loans Board while others are merely, shall we say, 
gimmicks used by individual authorities to assist their market activity. 
An ingenious town clerk can often raise finance upon a market that 
would deter lesser mE:n. These matters must now be considered. 
!nter Local Authority Cornpetition 
Cnmpetitic:,.n fc•r cz1pital as between different local authorities 
assumes three di:Jt:inct forrns. Firstly there is competition as between 
authorities of dUferent cldss, secondly there is competition as between 
authorities of dtfferent size and thirdly there is competition as between 
different projects. ComJidering firstly competition as between authori-
ties of varying classes. It has long been a notable feature of the 
market that some typeF.; of authorities are able to obtain finance more 
readily than others. Probably the most attractive class of loans to the 
investor are those offered by the hospital boards. These institutions are 
in a somewhat different position from other bodies in that they are now 
financed almost complctel)r by the Government. Thus from an investors 
point of view hospital board stock is able to offer the same security as 
Government stock but can offer a higher rate of interest. In fact it 
could almost be submitted that hospital boards are local spending 
agencies of the Central Government. This situation has tended to 
make these issues very popular upon the market especially with the 
insurance companies which provide sub-underwriting facilities. But at 
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the same time these issues have also had considerable appeal to the 
small lender because of a certain element of •glamour• which seems to 
be associated in the public mind with hospital works. 
Such has been the strength of the hospital boards upon the market 
thnt the Hospital•s Association of New Zealand made submissions to the 
Royal Commisston to the effect that should any local authority finance 
corporation be formed it should not raise loans for hospital purposes as 
in its opinton doing so ~N·ould 1 
"(a) Lose thc-1 <Jdva.ntagos ,)f public sentiment towards 1 and 
suppnrt of hc)S pital enterprises. 
(b) Tend t•1'Na.rds a decline in local energies and enthusiasm in 
the rais tng o.!: n.eces sary· finance. 
(c) Result in some loss of sU.mulus at present gained from 
inter uuthcrity competition for avatlable finance." 
In fact such has been the abHity of the hospHal boards to gain finance 
in preference tc other bcdies that it has been sugg-ested that the rate of 
interest on hospital board stock would be set at the G!ever:nment rate .. 
However this suggestion has i1ever been seriously pursued. 
On the other hand hospital boards h.:.1ve experienced some 
difficulty in floating renewal loans. These tend to present a problem 
for two distinct reasons. Firstly they must be raised in one full amount 
as they are, of course, always required to repay a parent loan and 
secondly they possess no •glamour appeal• as they can rarely be 
associated with some particular capital work. 
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Harbour boards. appear to .stand after hospital boards at the head 
of the market ~s far as ability to attract capital is concerned. Local 
patriotism. also plays a large part in making harbour board issues 
' . . . ' ., ' ' ' 
attractive to the investing public4 This has been ~ssisted in some 
instances, especially in the case of many secondary boards, by 
pointing out.to the local farmers. the amount that will be saved in 
freight costs by havin9 a local port •. Probably the best example in 
recent years of a harbour board playing upon the local interest to 
obtain finance i.s provided by the Southland Harbour Board vlhich 
recently raised an amount of £5 million for the construction of a new 
hflrbour at Bluff. The bnlk of this sum ""'ras derived from the Southland 
Area. These issues were accompanied by a very ,intensive 
advertising campaign. 
Some secondary hoards possess rating pov,,er and are t~erefore in 
a posit1.on to use a land rate as. a secur.ity backing for loan charges. 
This situation has been brought about mainly by shear necessity as 
very few secondary boards (which tn general, because. of lack of 
natural harbours, ha.ve been compelled to install more expensive works 
' ' 
than the major boards) could have afforded to finance large scale 
capital development purely from their revenue earnings. These rates, 
however, are almost invariably associated with a specific loan and 
the only bpard which has ever managed to obtain a general rating power 
is the Oamaru Board. As the secondary boards increase their revenue 
earnings these rating powers will almost certainly disappear, and the 
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secondary boards, like the major boards, wlll be forced to rely upon 
their assets to provide security for their loans. However, this 
apparent advantage that the secondary b6ards at present possess does 
not appear to have given them any advantage over the major boards in 
gaining capital finance .. 
Section 4 of the Trustee Act 1956, which sets out authorised 
trustee investments, cresents an interesting phenomena in respect to 
investment in lmrbuur board investments. Section 4 (1) (d) permits 
the unqualified i.nvet1tmc-"nt in the stock of seven different boards, i.e. 
AuckliJ nd , 'Nelli nqt., v;1. I, yttelton 1 Otago 1 Napier, Ti.maru and 
Southland 1 vvhi.le Recthn 11 (l) (e) permits investment in the stock of 
si.x other hoardB prnvtch-d. the particular lean h0.s a land rate as 
security backh1'J. Thus in this instance the legislature has attached 
some conshJ.erohk~ 1.mr•c-rtance to the .L=md rate n.s a security factor. It 
is of note th.::tt ulmc[Jt ,-:,.H of the very sc:~::~.n bn,Jrds are omitted 
completely from 'i:hf' r:~oct1.c:n (t.e. Nel::;on, Oamaru <md Greymouth). 
The Harbours {\ct l~i50 perrnitf.:; r1E hi:trbcur bo::~rds tc) levy iJ 
harbour tmproVe:mF.l!T~ rc:ltE: uron the car~y1 'Nh.ich thP.y h.1lndle and tlw 
proceeds of thi:> could d.cmbtless be used tc fXlY nH loan charges. 
After harbour bor1rds boroughs and counttes appear to stand upon 
virtually an equal foot~ng as far as the abiLity to raise finance t~ 
concerned. But this does not seem to apply in those cases where 
boroughs and counties are in com petition in a large urban area (e.g. 
Auckland) where, provided they are roughly of equal size 1 the boroughs 
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appear to have a slight advantage. Many of the backwoods counties, 
because of their isolated position and lack of demand, experience 
practically no opposition in raising capital. 
Standing right at the bottom of the list as far as ability to 
raise capital is concerned are the urban drainage boards. These 
authorities appear to experience considerable difficulty in gaining 
flnanc:e owing largely to the unappealing nature of the works to which 
they (lte corninitted ond to the fact that, as they are all centered in 
large urh::1n area::: they ;1rc subjected to i:ntense competition from other 
a uthorittes. 
I,,)oktn(J no-v,: \Ti: tL.t:,.; qu~;:stion of tho abHity of u local authority to 
gain flnauc;e in rclat/.(1!1 to its s~ze we: see that as a general proposition 
it is true to say th(.~t ;::; .br90 body can gain fin.::.wcG mcro readily than 
\'.rhcre small orld lar9e G.uthcri.ties<il"e comp:;king in '.:Jhat is vittuaUy the 
importanDE: in the t)a:::!do:ad .Area vvhere ubout three; .i:iidivldual authorities 
i.e. the Harb()ur und nosp'i.tt<:. lJourd.s and tho !'.uckl,md Gi.t}· Council, 
dominate the market to the exclucion of the other bodies in the area. 
A somev11hat similar situation exists in the ·;iVeUington area where the 
Hutt County tends to bu excluded. In the strictly rural areas this 
problem does not arise to any notable extent and as previously stated 
the 'backwoods' counties, irrespective of size, seem to experience 
little difficulty in obtaining finance. A further good example of a small 
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borough being excluded is provided by the \Illest Harbour Borough 
which is tucked into the northern boundary of Dunedin City. This 
body has experienced extreme difficulty over recent years in raising 
sufficient finance to cope with its sew·erage problems. It is possible 
that investment in this authority has been inhibited somewhat by the 
existence of. continuing speculation to the effect that the borough will 
amalgamate vrlth VunecHn City. 
The next point tr~ 'glamour appeal'. Some projects undertaken by 
loca1. authorittes seem to possess more appeal to the public than others. 
An already st[~tcll local [latrJottsm ts generally kindled by hospital and 
harbcur worbi but nc~~-;r Uhmri0s and town halls also appeal to the local 
spirit. On the other h,,nd an essential but muudane project Such as 
'l'hb: meam' tlmt 'J.rhU.\: 0 body may he o.b1.o to gatn finance on the market 
tcr :iW~HJ r<>rt'i.culdr rrc.jcct tt may not hn able to obtain finance for some 
local irrlerostc; cq~~Jri.: fru;.n the .local authority wf1o have assi::::ted .in 
raising money t.::J<tvnrJ!..i the COiilpletion of the asset. These interests 
include such concerns as local chambero of commerce, twenty 
thousand club.3, progressive assoc.iations and such like. l'v1any of the 
tepid swimming pools v;rhich have sprung up all over the country have 
been assisted in this way. But how often do we hear of a local 
chamber of commerce conducting a mystery envelope scheme to assist 
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a council with the financing of a neW sewerage system. 
The individual initiative of the secretary or clerk of the authority 
can also play a big part in ralsing finance. Thus assessing the 
correct time of the year to approach the market can be of considerable 
importance and this may vary according to the various districts 1 e. g. 
:in an area w.ith a substantial sheep farming element it would be advis-
able to commence advertising just after the wool cheques have come in. 
It is irn port1.mt nut to advertise at a time when the local population has 
substantial other conlinitments 1 o. g~ income tax payments to meet.· 
The ability "i:u assess whEJther money "is likely to be available in other 
parts of the countr~r ia also of considerable assistance. Many local 
authorities advertise their loan h:sues outside their own districts and 
it seems that they <:ire generally fairly successful in attracttng an 
inward migratton of cc::;pital. However, merely indiscriminate 
udvertising throughout th0 lenyth of the country on the off chance of 
picktng up a few pounds could prove very expensive. Before a clerk 
went looking for finance upon the open market in another district he 
w.:)uld have to be certa tn firstly 1 th;1t the money was available i.n that 
area 1 and secondly, that there were no locally situated authorities 
seeking finance at the same time. It does seem that there is some drift 
of capital from south to north and any larger North Island authority that 
advertised in the more wealthy farming areas of the South Island 1 e.g. 
Canterbury 1 Otago or Southland would be almost certain to pick up some 
money. 
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A further matter is the judicious use of 'tap loans • which are a 
very satisfactory device for maintaining contact with regular investors. 
Some power boords in the Auckland areafrlopted a practice of requiring 
consun~ rs ty invest a fev.• pounds in tbeir issues before certain 
services wou.LJ be installed in theit ptopertles. This met with con-
siderable opposition .::md at least from an ethical point of view it is 
qu.ite unsatisfactory • 
P.lpconu.mt l'Ge:c; 
About lS57 a ::;ysi:ern c.~f placen">>ai!.t (somet:Lmes c.alled prucuraih:m) 
fues w.J.s .i.ntrcduecd. This prov:i.Jed frJr th2 awkL:19 of a payment to an 
for .:1 iJ 1) year term 35/-· per cent 
The effect v1hich the payment of thtsu fee:; has had ur .. on the 
volume of ca pit~l flowing :J.nto the local authority sector is difficv.lt to 
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ascertain exactly. The system has probably induced some of the larger 
investors (e.g. insurance companies, where a very small increase in 
return can have a substantial· influence) to .invest in local authority 
securities but any very definite effects of the system an~ not evident. 
'l'he one interestiag feature of placement fees however, is that they 
provided a means whereby in effect a .local authority could place an 
:issue on the market at a discount; a practice which, according to the 
strict letter of the LJ.w· L3 illegal. 
Tap Loans 
Local authoritios ·dhich i.:lW .tn the hflbit cf raising most of their 
finance upun thu O;K'~1 wurl:et like to lnainta:bl cc.ntact with their regular 
subscribers and .sumst.tmes a practice i::_; ITtudG u£ c:trcular!sing all suh-
scr:i.b.ero tc, one pr1rtic.:uJar tssue, upon ths maturity of that .tosae wtth 
the view.' to g~tting them to i:nvcst in further lo;:.ms .' But another mG.thod 
ol maintaining ccnttucC W'ith re{§ular in'il8S'i:ors L1 by tho use of 'ti.:lp 
loans'. This practicu invol vos keepinu an issue open upon the rrtark.et 
for a very lengthy poriud of time ln order to provide an investment 
opportunity for regular :.mbscribers as well as anyone else who may 
chance along. This ensures that a steady :if small stream of finance 
will flow into the issue. Many loans, however ~.vill not lend them~elves 
to this e.g. in those cases where a large amount must be obtained 
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within a very short period of ttme. But the system would be very 
satisfactory for capital works of a continuing nature e.g. road works. 
In the rnid J.950~] after a period of some twenty years the Loans 
Bc:a.rc1 once aqain permttt.ed. the local authoriUes to undenvtite their 
loan ~.sr~ues. Umlon:,.rrtttw;i j:=; a procedure ·whereby the local body enters 
into D cnn.traci: wtth v [1!'tW:J.tiO: stockbrckcr, >:.\•hereby for the payment of 
i:i prescribed be th."': ::::L,cl:broker gw::rcvttees that th.e issue will be 
Fj -- ..... t~ · .J..·i ~-,J-'1"' T ..: .. ',r,·~-,-_,-·, .:,• ,..._ ~- ,":J "i". (-·r·; ... ,· nr.....--;..~11" -, •. -r.':"'' ,~,,)·,·, r.- ..... , m ,-=l,•nh~tl~ ~ ..-~- th'"' 
,1., •• L-'G. t.'l!..l."- -~. '""'" L·'·"'·' ,, ·'-·-'~:;,_, '-~ '"-·-·.l· ~, .·.,r~l.::· .• 2.. ,;.._.,_-:.~t-··- .. _. ,1,·.·-- _____ _.~,.._ll .• ~.- ..t •• r.~~-~ ~:.., ~ 
m.ark8t i::l nd. d i.\i'CTl:hi:J ilm~ nc:.:.; into the luccd. tiUtlK,r!ty sector, m1d for this 
and attompt to ;_-;-;isc r1!; rr_,u.ch ftnune:,~~ r;;; tt can fr.orn th;;.t sourc•:i before 
raise money var'i.es :::c~nrd!;·1g to tho 2''~.7.Fl of tho body it gener,:J.Hy comes 
about that thE1 m1derv\Trit•~rs "i.<\rill b'~ called upon to find a greater 
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proportion of the issue of a smallerauthorlty than of a larger one. 
To overcom~ the relattve disadvantage of the smaller authorities in 
this respect, therefore .. the Leans Board has adjuc;ted the amount that 
may be pa ld :in um.1er~nrlt:i.ng fees to accord with the size of the local 
a uthor.ity i.e. 
m.(~jor local authoritio_s 10/- per cent 
12/6 per cent 
15/- per cent 
Hence the I.ovno:1 P..-~:,-_ml has hore se8n .fit to tr~ko ~ction to remove any 
disability wh.kh_ m-:-:y b::-: snffer(_,"f:l by tho minor authorities but only in so 
far a::; nctuai 0-:::ttii it·? E['•:n the mt'lrk:et ts cnncernnd because f.n the 
the larger ;:mthrdty. 
would, or rc'lJ.rsr:, t.~·.kc~ l'-P th<-\t. port'.on of the issue not subscrihed by 
paid in fnll to the sub-mJner..-\•rUers. -r'htw ill. the ca,::c of an issue of 
£100,000, nno h~lf c·f ~11.rhich i~ contribv.teri by the RU.blic. the ~mb­
underwrtters could rAc.e:i.ve an amount of 30/- per cent upon the amount 
thot they ~ubscrihed, i.e. if the fee payf'lhle is 15/- per cent. It hus 
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been contended that in effect this amounts to an increase in the rate 
of interest payable to these investors and that they therefore enjoy a 
considerable advantage over the private investor who is entitled only to 
the standard ruling market rate of interest. It would appear that the 
actual underwriter gains his profit from the transaction by retaining the 
10/- per cent brokerage which the Loans Board also permits to be paid. 
Even so the payment of these fees has probably been a major factor in 
inducing insurance co:npantes and other large investors to place funds 
in local authority stock. 
Possibly the best way in which to continue this argument is to set 
out the more obvious odvantages and disadvantages of the practice of 
underwriting. 
The advantages of the system may be set out as follows: 
(a) It makes certain. thnt the issue will only be open upon the market 
for i3 1 imited p2.rtod of time. 
(b) It certifies th.:Jt the local authority ·iniU obtain the full amount of 
the issue and within a specified time. It could be pointed out 
here that upon some occasions the insurance companies have not 
had the cash upon hand just at the particular time when it was 
required and in such circumstances the situation is overcome by 
the underw'riter hypothecating debentures in order to obtain the 
finance immediately. When the necessary money is found by 
the insurance company the amount of the hypothecation is sub-
stituted therefore. 
132 
(c) It tends to induce the larger financial institutions to invest in 
local authority stock and as such it helps to provide long term 
investment for the authorities. 
(d) It makes for a more orderly approach to the market as the brokers 
are in a position to draw up programmes for market activity thus 
ensuring that compet!Uon is kept to a minimum. 
'fhe disadvanteges arc as follows: 
(a) Af3 stated Dbove the payment of underwriting fees could be looked 
upcn as an increase in tho effective rate of interest and as such 
increarws the eost of loan raising to the authorities. At the same 
thue .it result~, in a substantial :tncrease in 'income to the sub-
unden.rvrl.ters ·without any additional work on their part. This point 
is of greater potence when issues are more readily filled upon the 
open market. 
(b) Possibly one of the most objectional features of the system is that 
.it throws the potential of a local authority to raise loans .into the 
hands of a firm of private stockbrokers which is in a position to 
exercise discretion as to the issues which it underwrites. 
(c) Now not all authorities have availed themselves of underwriting 
facilities and even when it is permitted many local authorities 
prefer to go onto the market on their own account. This can 
provide some problems. If the particular authority is a large one 
and stands a fair chance of raising money then it would Incur 
hostility from the underwriters who were on the market at the same 
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time as it could draw finance away from the issues which were 
being underwritten. In turn , of course, the brokers provide 
opposition to the local authority which is not making use of 
undervvriting. This means that once underwriting is allowed there 
is a tendency for all to be caught up in the 'vicious circle' and 
it is very difficult to raise finance without the aid of the practice. 
Once an insurance company knows that it can obtain an under-
writing fee .it wiH be very loath to invest in local authority stock 
unless it knows that it will actually get that fee. 
(d) Underwriting ad.ds to the cost of raising the loan but this is offset 
to some extent by the reduced advertising costs as compared with 
those incurred in operations upon the open market. 
(e) The system appears to have the. tendency to induce many authori-
ties to rescJrt to underwriting irrespective of whether or not they 
could obtain the money in any other way. This is sometimes done 
s:tmply because open market operations would involve the staff of 
the local authority in more work than would raising the issue by 
making use of underwriting facilities. 
It was stated prev.iously that underwriting gives a slight market 
advantage to the smaller authority; or would it be better to say that it 
helps to even out the disadvantages that the smaller authority would 
normally suffet, but this statement now requires some amplification. 
It has long been a matter of some conjecture as to whether underwriting 
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operates to the advantage of the smaller or the larger local authority. 
On ;the one hand there are those who say that it operates to the 
advantage of the larger authority because¥ as its loans will be more 
readily filled, there will be a greater tendency for .the brokers to take 
the larger authority on. This is true; the loans of the larger authorities 
and hospital bonrd issues are very attractive to the insurance companies 
about this there can be no doubt. But insofar as a larger authority 
decides to go on to the market on its own the system operates to the 
advantage of the smaUGr authority. In any event the smaller body is 
called upon to pay a hi9her fee. The authority that would be at the 
greatest disadvc:mtage v-muld be the smaller authority which could not 
obtain access to underwriting facilities when the practice was in 
general use. 
Broadly speaking it is the bodies in the larger urban areas and the 
urban dra.tn..'ige boards which have been. forced to make use of the 
practice. Very few South Island local authorities have ever resorted to 
the use of underwriting and most of the mral bodies in the North Island 
have been able to raise their issues without the assistance of under-
writ.ing. 
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NEW PRACTICES AND INSTITUTIONS 
From time to time various proposals have been put forward as 
providing a remedy for the defects existing in the market or as a 
means of streamlining or increasing the efficiency of the market. 
These fall roughly into three distinct categories; some involve the 
introduction of new practices and procedures; others involve a 
tighter administrative control over access to the market while others 
involve the establishment of entirely new institutions. 
Some of these have already been touched upon (e.g. an 
extension of the present trustee sav.ings bank syste~ and this 
section makes a survey of the more notable proposals which have 
not already been considered. Many of these were submitted to, 
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and commented upon, by the Royal Commission on Local Authority 
Finance. A survey such as this lends itself to much speculation and 
must of necessity give rise to a considerable amount of conjecture. 
Death Duty Stock 
The proposal that local auth<r ities should be permitted to 
issue death duty stock was submitted to the Royal Commission by 
the Harbours Association of New Zealand. The Commission 
approved the proposal in principle and the following comment 
appears on page 36 of the Report. 
"It was suggested that local bodies should be allowed to 
issue 'death duty• stock in the same way as the Government, 
the proposal being that the local body would redeem the 
stock at par in the event of the purchasor dying before the 
maturity date. This would probably not be advisable for 
sm,.ller local bodies or even for larger ones in unlimited 
amounts, but we think it might with advantage be allowed 
for such amounts in each particular case as the Loans 
Board might approve." 
The proposal is, therefore, that this class of stock could be 
taken up at par and then redeemed at pa.r upon the death of the 
holder specifically for the purpose of paying death duties. The big 
advantage of this from the point of view of the investor is that 1t 
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.can be redeemed before the maturity date without loss 1• The intention 
behind the proposal is, of course i to obtain increased investrm nt in 
local author~ty stoc~~ This class of stock would clearly be of coni""' 
siderable advantage especially to elderly investors but its disadvant-
ages from ~he point of view of the local authority are obvious • It 
would probably be necessary to establish a sinktng fund or a pool 
account<f some description to provide for repayment in cases where 
a very heavy commitment accrues ~. g • where the whole of the loan 
has been taken up by the one investor • It is possible that this 
difficulty could be overcome if the National Provident Fund or some 
other institution guaranteed the redemption of the stock. 
Whether the issue of death duty stock would attract any 
considerable volume of finance to the local authorities must remain 
a matter of conjecture but as yet the Government has not given any 
b1dication that it intends to introduce the practice. The proposal is 
only of int.erest to the individual investor it would clearly not apply 
to institutional investment and at the same time each investor would 
'' ' ' ' 
only really be concerned to invest sufficient to cover his own death 
duties i as presumably only sufficient to cover death duties could be 
redeemed at par at death •. · It seems probable that the is. sue of this 
class of stock would cause a small but sustained increase in the 
volume offunds invested in local authority stock by the small 
lenders. 
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Premium Bonds 
Premium bonds are bonds that would be redeemed at a premium 
at maturity date. Suggestions that local authorities should be 
permitted to issue these bonds were submitted to the Royal 
Commission which made the following comment upon the matter: 
"The issue of premium bonds was also suggested either on 
the system now existing in the United Kingdom or on a 
system similar to that operated by building societies. We 
think these schemes may have some attraction for investors, 
and the Government might well observe the result of the 
experiment in England. If that seems strikingly successful 
it might consider the adoption of some such scheme either for 
its own loans or for those of local bodies or both." 
The issue of premium bonds would to some extent be in the same 
category as the issue of stock at a discount.. Devices such as these 
would certainly divert some finance to local authorities but they would 
also have the effect of increasing considerably the expense of 
borrowing and it is doubtful if any additional benefit which might be 
derived would be worth the added expense involved. The general 
policy of the Government has been to keep the cost of local authority 
borrowing as low as possible and it seems unlikely that it would 
permit the issue of this class of stock~ This is especially so in 
view of the fact that the issue of premium bonds would have to be 
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considered after the introduction of other cost increasing practices 
(e.g. undeiWriting) which have clear advantages in other directions. 
Determination of Priorities 
It has been suggested that the approach to the market could 
be made much more orderly if some system was devised whereby each 
loan project was accorded a rating of priority in terms of essentiality 
and that the more essential projects were permitted access to 
capital ahead of those that were less essential. The Report of the 
Royal Commission made the followirg comment upon this matter 
(Report paragraph (d) page 49): 
"We find that the demands of local bodies on loan funds should 
be regulated and controlled by the local Government Loans 
Board so that the market may be properly organised and 
priority ensured- within the capacity of the market- for the 
most urgent and essential works. " 
However the Commission did not put forward any specific 
proposals for a scheme of priorities and indeed it would appear that 
the major problem involved in implementing this proposal is, in fact, 
the devising of a satisfactory system of setting priorities that would 
be universally acceptable. 
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The first point' to decide is who or what institution wUi draw 
up the schedule of priority. If a local authority finance corporation 
was ever established in New Zealand it would seem that this would 
be the logical body to draw up such a schedule. But in the absence 
of such an organisation the task would probably fall to the Loans 
Board~· However up until the present time the Loans Board has made 
no at~em pt to introduce rigid orders of priority but has considered 
essentia1ity from a very broad point of view. 
Priorities could be set by classifying all loan applications I 
either before or after the approval of the Loans Board had been 
granted t into ·categories (e.g. either a, b or c). Projects placed 
in one category could be awarded absolute or a degree of preference 
while those placed in the other, lower categories would be either 
denied access to the market or accorded limited access. A system 
of shifting projects from a lower to a category of higher preference 
in certain circumstances or upon the fulfilment of certain conditions 
could possibly be devised. On the other hand an even more rigid 
system of co-ordination could be established by according to each 
separate project a set time upon the market at some set date in the 
future. 
In order to implement any system of priority at all it would be 
necessary for each local authority to submit details of its borrowing 
programme for some years ahead. The necessary information would 
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have to comprise such matters as, the balance of loans approved but 
not raised, the loan mo~eys required for wcrks commenced and 
proposed works likely to be commenced within say, each of the 
following three years. Figures would also have to be given for each 
work or group of work.s that would form one loan proposal. These 
items would giV'e total loan requirements., .The figures would also 
•' 
have. to be broken down further into proposed expenditure for each 
rel(;!vant year and then further sul)divided into (say) approximate 
quarterly or preferably monthly expenditure requirements. Relevant 
technical data would also have to be submitted with each loan 
proposal. 
The allocating authority would then be faced with the question 
of estimating the amount of money that is likely to be available so 
that priority could' be estabUs);led in accordance with the amount of 
finance that is likely to be forthcoming. This would have to include 
estimates of amounts available from the open market as well as that 
which is likely to be forthcoming from the various institutions* At 
. . ' ' . 
the .same time it would be necessary to retain a fairly substantial 
amount in reserve to meet possible emergency items which could 
not reasonably have been forecast e.g .. a loan made necessary to 
repair.damage .caused by a flood .. 
It can .therefore be seen that any system of determining 
priorities or attempting to co-ordinate borrowing is bound to be 
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riddled with many problems. Firstly there is the great difficulty 
involved in estimating local authority loan requirements and the 
even greater problem in gauging the potential of the market. 
Secondly such a system would be cumbersome, would involve delay, 
would mean more control and would' be bound to arouse discontent 
among those authorities whose works were accorded a lower priority. 
It would mean that the body doing the allocating would probably have 
to employ a number of research officers to investigate the var~ous 
loan proposals and to estimate the market.. Effective co-ordination 
would clearly require the covering of a very wide field of investment 
as it is doubtful if co-ordination of a part only of the entire market 
would be satisfactory. A priority system would mean that demand on 
the market would be curtailed and it is possible that this would have 
the effect of ultimately making less funds available to the local 
authority sector. 
Some districts have already experimented with the idea of 
co-ordinating market activity. In 1955 a committee of local 
authorities known as the Auckland Area Joint Works Committee was 
established in the Auckland Area for the purpose of programming 
capital works in that Area. The Committee did not, however, under-
take independent investigation of individual local body proposals. 
It received submissions from the local authorities upon their 
proposals and used these as a basis for its own detailed 
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examination of the programme. This would I of course I hardly 
suffice for a body exercising direct and complete control on all 
local authority loan issues, and 'independent investigation 'of the 
priority claims ofloan proposals would, it seems, be essential • 
.Qptional Redemption Date Investments 
The issue of optional redemption date investments would 
involve issuing stock which could be redeemed at the option of · 
either the lender or the borrower, or both, at say, five or seven 
yearly intervals. This proposal is very closely related to that men-
tioned i.n the section dealing with the rate of interest whereby 
interest rates could be revised at intervals to bring them into line 
with current ruling rates. A proposal of this nature would operate 
almost ·completely to the disadvantage of the localaJthority except 
possibly in that situation where interest rates were falling and 
finance· was super abundant. 'If an investor decided to redeem 
before the full maturity date the loan would require to be re-
financed and this could cause some acute administrative problems 
to the local authorities. 
The view that local authorities should be permitted to issue · 
. . ' . ' 
optional redemption date stock· was submitted to the Royal 
Commission on Local Authority Finance by the Electrical Supply 
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Authorities of New Zealand but it was not commented upon. by the 
Commission in its:Report and it appears unlikely that any such 
system will ever be introduced. 
Municipal Bank 
From time to time it has. been mooted that a municipal bank 
should be established in New Zealand but at no point have any 
very specific proposals been put forward. It has been suggested 
that such a bank would operate in complement to a local authority 
finance corporation while some have believed that its functions 
would overlap those of a finance corporation thus rendering it 
unnecessary if the corporation was set up. The general intention 
appears to be that the bank should act essentially as a lender of 
short term finance while the finance corporation would be concerned 
mainly with the provision of long term finance i.e. the bank would 
be complementary to the corporation. The bank would provide over-
draft accommodation to the authorities at a lower rate than that 
charged by the trading banks and would accept deposits upon short 
tenn. It is thus envisaged that the bank could take over some of the 
functions now carried out by the National Provident Fund. The bank 
would not act as a general savings repository accepting money from 
the general public. The general proposal seems to be that the bank 
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would operate throughout New Zealand by means of agencies con-
ducted by the Banko~ New Zealand and it would operate cheque 
facilities. It would appear that a~ initial capital of at least 
£100, 000 would be required to commence operations. 
The view that a municipal bank should be set up was put to 
the Royal Commission by the Municipal Association of New Zealand 
and the Commission made the following comment thereon ~eport 
paragraph 104 page 36): 
"The establishment of a municipal ba~k was another method 
. suggested for improving the financing of local body capital 
projects A ·The suggestion was made by the Municipal 
. . ' ' 
Association as being complementary to a .suggested Local 
Authority Finance Corporation (which ~e will presently deal 
with) and .it was urged that while this matter should be 
seriously considered it should not cause delay in the pro-
visiol) of the Finance Corporation while the question of 
banking received further consideration .. We find some 
difficulty in seeing the necessity for a municipal bank if 
the proposed Corporation ts established and we think the 
, proposal may well be deferred until it is decided whether or 
. not a Cotporation is. to be set up and, if so; wh~ther its 
operations call for any further banking facili.ties ... 
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Local Authority Finance Corporation 
The following schedule of proposed powers and functions of a 
possible Local Authority Finance Corporation is taken from the Report 
of the Royal Commission (Report paragraph 110 page 38). Several 
other parties have also put forward proposed sets of powers and 
functions but basically they all seem to conform to this one funda-
mental pattern. 
(a) To take over those powers and functions of the National 
Provident Fund Board now delegated to the Investment Committee. 
These include. 
(i) The purchase and sale of Government and local body 
securities. 
(ti) Temporary advances upon hypothecation of securities. 
(iii) Underwriting loans. 
(iv) Borrowing on overdraft. 
(v) Providing investment for depreciation funds, sinking funds, 
trust funds and loan moneys not immediately required. 
(vi) Investment of surplus funds. 
(b) As a primary function to lend to local authorities the funds 
accruing from the above activities and funds raised by Corporation 
borrowing. 
(c) To act in an advisory capacity to local authorities and to 
achieve some co-ordination in local authority borrowing. 
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(d) To issue its own stock or debentures I which would have 
trustee status I against the security of debentures held from local 
authorities. 
(e) The power to raise loans overseas for local authorities. 
(f) Take over from the Natio.nal Provident Fund approximately 
£15 million of invested funds from local authority superannuation 
activities plus about £5 million of local authority reserves and other 
moneys temporarily deposited with the Fund. 
(g) Normal overdraft accommodation to enable the Corporation 
to keep its funds fully invested with local authorities '· and any other 
financial assistance through the Reserve Bank as may be deemed 
necessary by the Bank for the implementation and extension of the 
Corporation's activities. 
The Royal Commission went on to recommend that the 
Corporation should ultimately possess the sole right to raise loans and 
to underwrite for local .authorities but with the power to contract and 
"-. .,_ 
to pay for sub-underwriting. The Corporation should be self sufficient 
and self supporting and any profit which it may make should be 
retained by tt to increase its lending resources. Care should be taken 
to select and maintain a skilled and experienced staff. 
It would appear therefore, that what is envisaged is a highly 
specialised institution separated from the control of the Government 
but nevertheless sp,onsored by the Government lending institutions. 
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Now the question arises as to the form which the institution should 
take. According to the outline given above virtually all of the functions 
at present carried out by the National Provident Fund W()Uld be taken 
over by the Corporation. 
In regard to (d) above it can be seen that the security backing 
for the Corporation's debentures would be the debentures it holds from 
the local authorities. Thus in the ultimate the Corporation would have 
the rating potential of the various local authorities as the security 
backing for its debentures and stock. The Corporation would not 
raise money except in exchange for local authority debentures. The 
r.ight of persons holding debentures from the Corporation would there-
fore be to take over the debentures which the Corporation is holding. 
This raises the questton of whether the Corporation would go on to the 
market to raise loans for each specific loans project or whether it 
would borrow generally. Borrowing generally may I in many cases 1 be 
a better proposition as if 1t attempted to obtain money for specific 
projects for individual local authorities its money raising potential 
would be considerably restricted by the nature of the particular local 
authority and the proposed project. 
One further function which a Corporation could undertake would 
be a co-operative insurance scheme for local authorities. All the 
profits from this could be invested in local authority stock. At present 
the insurance companies are required to keep substantial cash reserves 
but if both were combined the cash reserves of insurance companies 
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could be merged with the liquid reserves of the Corporation hence 
cutting the total need for reserves as there would be no need for both 
parties to hold reserves. 
One vexed questio1;1 is the initial amount of capital which the 
Corporation would require and the source from which it could obtain 
this capital~ It is most unlikely_that the Corporation could get any 
automatic access to ~e capital accruals of the National Provident 
Fund, i..e. despite the recommendations of the Royal Commission, and 
it would probably be necessary for it ~o obtain a capital structure else-
where. The ~mount of initial capital that would be required would, of 
course, depend to a large extent upon how extensive its functions 
were to be. It has been submitted that £5 million would be required 
while others have stated that £2 million or even £1. S million would 
suffice. The difficulty would be to find someone to contribute this 
sum. It could be put up by the National Provident Fund together with 
several different insurance companies in a joint effort. It is possible 
that this sum would remain uncalled and would act merely as a 
security backing for the Corporation. At the present time there does 
not appear to be any prospect of Reserve Bank credit being used to 
finance the Corporation as this could prove inflationary. The day to 
day operations of the Corporation would most likely be run. upon the 
'pool system' (similar to that at present in use by the National Providen 
Fund). T:hts 'pool' would contain the surplus moneys contributed by 
the local authorities. 
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However one major problem with utilising a capital structure is 
that the contributors of the capital would expect a return upon their 
investment. It has thus been suggested that instead of relying upon 
contributed capital the Corporation could obtain its initial finance by 
means of a levy upon all New Zealand local authorities which would 
be made upon the rates of the territorial authorities and upon the 
revenues of the 'ad-hoc' authorities. A levyof ld in the £1 upon all 
rateable property made annually over a period of ten years would 
produce an amount well in excess of £50 million. 
As the Corporation would exert a very substantial influence in 
the market it would be necessary for it to operate in close co-
operation with the Treasury and the Reserve Bank so that its: activities 
could be harmonised with the economy of the country as a whole. To 
this end it is possible that the debentures of the Corporation would be 
issued only upon the approval of the Minister of Finance. 
The next point is overdraft accommodation. It is probable that 
about £1 million in overdraft accommodation would be required. 
This would be necessary to cover fluctuations between the receipt of 
revenues and the payout of commitments for investments. The National 
Provident Fund at present maintains a system whereby it can sell 
Government Stock at short notice to finance unexpected liabilities but 
being an independent institution the Corporation could hardly operate 
a system such as this. Overdraft accommodation would be vital to the 
Corporation to enable it to keep its funds fully invested and it is 
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possible that temporary advances c·ould be made by the Reserve Bank 
i.e. the Reserve Bank could act as the Corporation•s banker. 
How comprehensive would the activities of the Corporation be? 
Would it raise the total amount of finance required by the local 
authority sector, would it raise loans or supply funds only to certain 
classes of authorities, or would any local authority be free to seek the 
aid of the Corporation or to make its own approach to the market as it 
desired? But it is certain that many of the larger bodies would still 
prefer to raise their own loans and even most of the smaller authorities 
would probably still prefer to approach the market upon their own 
behalf in those cases where they were sure of raising the finance. 
This being the case the Corporation would frequently be operating upon 
the market in competition with various local authorities. To overcome 
this difficulty a syst~m of programming market activity would have to 
be devised to ensure that the Corporation was not merely taking funds 
away from those bodies which happened to be seeking finance at the 
same time as the Corporation. 
An amendment to the Trustee Act 1956, would be necessary to 
give the securittes of the Corporation trustee status. It is likely that 
some element of Government guarantee would be required to clinch the 
trustee status o£ the Corporation • s secwi.ties ~ 
Now 'We must consider the possi.ble advantages which would 
accrue from such an institution. It could provide expert advice upon 
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the raising of loans and other financial matters which would be of 
great assistance especially to the smaller local bodies. T~e Corpora-
tion could act as a buffer between Government and the local authorities 
At the present time available finance is not spread evenly throughout 
the country; this situation would be rectified. A Corporation would 
obtain more money fer local authcrities in the aggregate than all 
individual authorities working independently as it would have more 
prestige than any single local author.tty ~ By assisting the smaller 
local authorities it would mitigate the present .disadvantageous 
position suffered by the smaller bodies. As the nature of the particular 
body would be an immaterial factor in the lending policy of the 
Corporation the present disadvantages suffered by some classes of 
authorities could largely disappear. A single type only of local body 
security would be on the market and this would be far more readily 
negotiable than the many and varied securities which are upon the 
market at present. It would act as a short term money market for local 
authorities. The debentures or stock of the Corporation would be 
readily marketable and since the Corporation, when well established, 
would have sufficient reserves (in the form of reserves made up by 
amortization payments or in other ways) to redeem its debentures or 
stock at par or thereabouts, an investor who was forced to realise 
before maturity date would have a smaller chance of loss through 
depreciation in the value of his security than in the case of debentures 
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in a smaller body for which there was only a limited market. The 
securities of the Corporation cculd be offered to the public in varying 
units and tn several different forms to improve their attractiveness to a 
wide range of investors • These bonds would be sold throughout the 
country, at banks 1 post offices 1 trustee companies and so on. 
·But two advantages which could be derived from such an institu-
tion stand out above all others. Firstly by stabilising the supply of 
finance to local authorities it would assist in stabilising the rate of 
interest. Secondly the Corporation would be in a position to borrow 
short and to lend long and this would rriean that the authorities would 
not be forced to resort to rely upon short term finance to the extent 
which they do at present. 
However, some believe that the establishment of such an 
institution may encourage many to enter the field for loans when the 
cost of the project could more readily be met from revenue. As finance 
would be more readily available reckless spending may be encouraged. 
It was previously mentioned that the Corporation would be able to raise 
more for local bodies than the aggregate of local authorities but this 
could be a major factor to operate against the Corporation as the 
greater power the Corporation has upon the market the more it is likely 
to conflict with the activities of the Government. The administration 
costs of the Corporation would be considerable; possibly in the 
vicinity of £40 I 000 per year. The activities of the National Provident 
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Fund would be seriously depleted. It woold need the services of a 
large and highly trained staff and it is very doubtful if such a staff 
could be recruited in New Zealand at the present time. Could such an 
institution operate at a profit? It must remain a matter of some con-
jecture whether the Corporation would draw more savings out of the 
community or whether it would merely take finance away from the other 
sectors of the market. 
It has been stated that the Corporation would issue blanket 
debentures and would probably not raise loans for individual projects 
or bodies. But if it did this the local interest in many loans would be 
seriously diminished and indeed it has been stated that regional 
loyalties based on a composite of utilitarian and prideful interest on 
the part of local residents, do in fact function as a benevolent under-
writer of local body loans and make a valuable contribution towards 
their success. The Corporation may be able to overcome this by 
raising some issues upon a blanket b:~sis and raisi.ng in respect of a 
certain project in those cases where it is obvious that local interest 
would be of asststance in finding the finance. 
Of all the propo::;als which have been put for..vard as providing a 
remedy for the ills which beset the local authorities when they approacl1 
the market this is the most challenging and is the one which has 
received the greatest publicity. There can be no doubt that the 
existence of any such institution would constitute a major force within 
the market. 
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The Royal Commission approved the establishment of a Local 
Author.lty Finance Corporation and made the following comment (Report 
page 39 paragraph 111) 
"The Corporation would not have, initially, the sole right to 
raise loans for local bodie!3, but local bodies should be . 
encouraged to use it a:pd, ultimately, when fully established 
a.nd operating, it could become the sole issuing authority. It 
should be the sole underwriter , for local body loans but with 
p~er to contract and pay for sub-underwriting.. We think this 
• is necessary to protect and recognise the status of th.e Corpora-
tton and to prevent undue cutting and competition~ we do not 
think it advisable to authorise the Corporation to act as an 
insurance company nor to empower it to make a. levy on local 
authorities, except for the purpose of recouping losses - which 
should not occur. The Coq:oratton should be self sufficient and 
. . 
self supporting; it should be able to make some profit but this 
profit would be retained by the Corporation to increase its 
lending resources and might well be used for mak~ng loans on 
especially favourable terms to needy local bodies • Particular 
care should be taken .to select and maintain c;t. skilled a no 
experienced staff. '' 
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Increased Government Subvention 
Conditional and unconditional grants in aid from the Central 
Government play a major part in the financing of local government in 
the United Kingdom but, except perhaps in respect- to hospital boards, 
are not used to any great extent in New Zealand. It should be pointed 
out that the scope of local government activities is much wlder in the 
United Kingdom than it is in this country. 
It could well be argued tha.t extensive Government assistance in 
the financing of local bodies means a negation of the whole concept 
of local government and implies that the authorities are merely local 
spending agencies of the Central Government. However, an 
examination of the existing situation seems to indicate that 
Government assistance; does not bring about a weakening of the fabric 
of local government. Indeed the opposite appears to be the case. 
From time to time chairmen of various local authority organisations 
have commented upon the lack of financial assistance from the 
Government and some competition has arisen among the various 
classes of authorities for assista.nce. Financial aid in any form has 
been freely accepted. 
Assistance vV'hlch has been granted in the past has been 
designed largely to further Government policy rather than to provide 
sustenance for the authorities. Examples of this include the provision 
of subsidies for pensioner .flats and sewerage works. Grants of this 
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nature assist in extending the range of local actiVity as well as 
furthering Government policy. 
Apart from subsidies subvention has taken the form of reduced 
interest rate loans and occasionally, unconditional grants. We are 
faced with a minor problem in definition when we come to consider 
subsidies paid by the National Roads Board which is now one of the 
major sources of subsidy finance for local government. The funds of 
this organisation do not have to be appropriated by Parliament. On 
the other hand it is financed largely by a tax on petrol. 
One of the major problems involved ln the granting of additional 
aid is the difficulty of financing it. Governments have been hesitant 
to take action to assist local bodies if that action is likely to prove 
politically inexpedient. Increased assistance to the authorities would 
mean increased taxation in some form or other. It is for this reason 
that many of the recommendations of the Royal Commission have never 
been implemented e.g. the local body levy of 2d in the pound on 
earnings, which incidentally, to make matters worse from a political 
point of view, it was suggested should be collected by the Central 
Government. 
Additional Sources of Revenue 
Additional sources of revenue which were made available to the 
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territorial authorities could be diverted to capital uses. The political 
problems involved here are even more potent than those associated 
with Government subvention .. 
Rates have long been the major source of revenue for the 
territorial authorities and are likely to remain so if only for the reason 
that the limits of the property over which they are levied can be 
readily defined. Rates provide the basis of local body income in most 
Western Countries, but in some instances they are supplemented by 
income from such items as local income and sales taxes, citizen 
taxes and levies. Legislation would be necessary to implement 
proposals of this nature arxl although the revenue collected would be 
for local government the taxpayers would be inclined to regard the 
imposition as merely another tax and the brunt of the blame foe its 
introduction would, therefore, fall upon the Central Government. 
A local sales tax (i.e. a tax on retail sales) would probably 
have to be collected and levied on a regional basis. If such a tax 
was not at a uniform rate throughout the country, consumers may be 
induced to travel outside their district of residence in order to gain 
the advantage of cheaper purchases. Opposition from business 
interests could be expected to any proposal to introduce a local sales 
tax in New Zealand. 
The range of local trading activities could be extended i.e. 
boroughs and counties could be permitted to engage in the retail 
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selling of electrical appliances. Incidentally t'his practice is 
already carried 01i upon a limited scale. A proposal of this nature 
would also encounter opposition from the business world and it is 
unlikely that smaller authorities would be in a position to derive any 
great· benefit from increased trading activities. 
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CONCLUSION 
Having analysed the situation we conclude the study by 
reverting to the original question which we set out to answer: 
"Is the market organised in the way that best ensures an 
adequate flow of ·capital to this sector?" 
It has been established that we cannot permit local 
authorities to compete upon a free 'uncontrolled market. The 
competitive forces operating between the authorities themselves 
and the overall nature of tpe work they are required to 
undertake together with the effect of the other sectors d~ctate 
. ' ' . 
a considerable degree.of Government..control and subvention. 
. . ' . ' 
A possible summary of the major problems may be as 
follows. 
(a) 
(b) 
(c) 
(d) 
(e) 
Inter authority ·competition 
Competition from outside sectors 
F:luctuating costs of raising and servicing loans 
A dimunition of available sources of supply 
. . ' 
In the light of the comments made in the preceding 
section the fact that there is political opposition to 
the introduction of new institutions or additional 
sources of revenue to assist local authorities. 
(f) Overall lack of finance coupled with a dependance 
upon short term finance. 
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These various problems are to some extent interdependent 
and are generally the result of each other. 
As previously indicated inter local authority competition 
affects mainly the small boroughs wtth essential works who are 
forced to _compete with larger neighbours. Even a substantial 
increase in the supply of capital may not wholly eliminate this 
problem. The fluctuating costs of raising and servicing loans 
also affects I in the rna in, the smaller bodies. The smaller 
authorities are already permitted to pay higher underwriting fees 
and tt would be undesirable to allow them to pay higher interest 
rates thereby increasing costs still further. 
Despite the recommendations of the 1958 Royal 
Commission to the effect that the ultimate aim should be free 
interest rates, this prospect could not be contemplated in 
present conditions. 
In respect to competition from outside the sector it has 
been pointed out that in relatl.on to the urgency and importance 
of their needs I the authorities are probably obtaining an equitable 
share of the overall amount of available capital. There has been 
little eVidence that any really essential works have been either 
prevented from proceeding or seriously delayed through lack of 
finance. But this point could hardly be used as an argument 
against any further reform of the local authority sector of the 
market. 
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Government influence in the' market makes it most 
unlikely that the authorities will be granted any preferences or 
endowed with any further devices which would enable them to 
gain a greater share of the market to the detriment of other 
sectors. The recommendation of the Royal Commission to the 
effect that a local authority finance corporation be established 
has 1 therefore · despite frequent agitation 1 never been 
implemented. All this amounts to very little consolation for 
local bodies. 
The gradual decline in insurance company investment in 
this field has resulted in the authorities turning increasingly to 
the small inves tor and the government institutions as sources 
of finance. The State Advances Corporation has ceased acting 
as a general lender leaving the National Provident Fund as the 
major state lending institution. The small investor is a fickle, 
and in some respects unsatisfactory lender. He is of limited 
use to the smaller boroughs in the large urban areas and has 
little value as a lender of long term finance. The authorities 
have tended therefore to rely more upon the Central Government 
· as a source of capital as well as revenue finance. However the 
limitations involved in extending this form of assistance further 
have' been considered in the previous section. 
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Possible Remedies 
There is no magic remedy universally applicable which 
will instantly solve the existing problems and only piecemeal 
solutions can be submitted. 
The scope and problem of local finance could be said to 
depend upon the position of local government within the general 
governmental system of the Country. Changing conditions have 
necessitated new distributions of functions between central and 
local government. No set pattern of local government central 
government division of responsibiltty has evolved; the matter 
rests almost entirely upon ad hoc policy considerations. The 
financial problems could conceivably be tackled by effecting 
further transfers of functions from local to Central Government. 
Moves in this direction would probably result in a more efficient 
use of available capital but at the same time would mean a 
weakening of the political structure of local government. 
Reform is a more immediate possibility. Shifts in 
population have weakened the local government framework 
especially in the rural areas and have made reform an urgent 
necessity. So far however legislative incompetence has 
prevented any really effective reforms from taking place. 
It has been pointed out that the territorial authorities 
are generally not permitted to build up general reserves which 
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could be used at a later date for capital development. Section 
143 of: the Municipal Corporations Act grants to boroughs the 
power .to set up funds for the renewal repair replacement or 
improvement of any property, plant, fiXtures or appliances.· 
The Audit Office has greatly restricted the utility of this section 
by requiring .that any funds which are established under its 
provisions must be eamtarked for a specific purpose~ Whether 
this narrow interpretation was the original intention of the 
legislation must remain a matter of some doubt but there is· no · 
question that this provision could be used as authority for 
municip,alities to build up reserves for a wide variety of 
purposes. If a reserve was established for one purpose there 
would probably be no restriction upon it being used later for 
another purpose provided it came within the scope of the section. 
These reserves would be financed from rating revenue. It 
appears therefore that if the restrictions upon the use of this 
section were liberalised the way would be open for municipalities 
to accumulate reserves which could be diverted to capital 
expenditure.. This would mean less reliance upon the market 
and could be very useful, especially to smaller boroughs which 
had reasonably low rating levels. It must be admitted that such 
a practice could be open to abuse but the control exercised by 
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the Audit Office should be able to keep any misuse of the 
section to a minimum. 
Considerable progress towards solving the present 
financial problems could probably be made by introducing into 
New Zealand a system which has been in use in the United 
Kingdom for almost forty years, i.e. the "loans pool". These 
are somewhat analogous to the investment pool run by the 
National Provident Fund except that every individual authority 
would have its own "pool account". The great virtue of these 
devices is that they would do away entirely with the need for 
sinking and depreciation funds; or to put it. more succinctly, 
the money which is at present invested in sinking, depreciation, 
and re.newal funds could be made more readily available to 
finance capital works. It could be argued that as things stand 
at present there is a certain amount of double financing, i.e. 
I 
simultaneous borrowing and lending. Section 9 (6) of the 
Local Authorities Loans Act requires that authorities when · 
borrowing must make provision for the repayment of the loan 
and this is sometimes effected (although not universally by 
any means) by the establishment of a sinking fund, . Sinking 
Fund Commissioners are appointed to invest these funds in 
trustee investments as directed by the local authority. An 
. . 
analogous situation exists in respect to depreciation funds. 
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As at 31 March 1963 local authorities had ext.ernal sinking and 
depreciation funds totalling approximately £7.5 million and it is 
notable that in that same year they sought some .£10 mtllton on 
the market. The poolsystem would enable much of the money 
available tn the sinking funds to be diverted to capital 
expenditure. Before pointing out the further possible 
advantages of the pools system we will examine the mechanism 
of the system in a ltttle more detail. 
As far as British practice is concerned the authority 
sets up a loans pool which is actually the sole borrowing and 
lending unit of the authority, i.e. all the authority's capital 
financing transactions go through the pool. The pool is 
financed by loan moneys received 1 contributions from rate 
income together with other m.iscellaneous capital receipts. 
The pool actually makes the capital expenditure as required 
and instalments of principal and interest are collected from 
the other departments of the authority. The pool borrows 
externally of course, and when external loans fall due for 
repayment the necessary finance is usually obtained by 
re- borrowing. 
Now if a system such as this is to be introduced into 
New Zealand a few modifications would seem to be required. 
Firstly if each local authority is to have its own pool and· 
external borrowing is still to be carried out I then the pool 
system would not go far towards solving the problems of the 
smaller authorities because the smaller pools Y.Ould probably 
still experience the great difficulty in obtaining finance that 
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the lesser local bodies do at the present time. It would appear• 
therefore that collective pools containing a number of different 
authorities would be more suitable to New Zealand conditions. 
These could be organised on a regional, sub-provincial, or even 
provincial basis but should preferably contain a good cross 
section of authorities of different classes and sizes both urban 
and rural. Coupled with the point just mentioned, provision 
should be made to compel the non terrltorial trading authorities, 
e.g. harbour boards , to invest in their own pool, or if no 
investment opportunities exist there, in some other pool. Thi.s 
would mean that local authority investment was kept within the 
local authority sector. The reserves of the trading departments 
of the territorial authorities could also be invested in the pools. 
It can be seen that the greater the number and variety of 
authorities in a pool, the greater would be its chances of 
obtaining finance. It is pos~ib.le that some legislation may be 
needed to require authorities to invest in the pools. The 
attractiveness of investment in the pools would depend largely 
upon what was offering outside, but it would certainly be 
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advisable to divert as much local authority investment as possible 
into the pools • , 
A further point that would have to be settled would be 
the avenue for the short.term investment. at. present taken by the 
National Provident Fund.. Should these be channelled into the 
pools? In view of tha problems surrounding the administration 
of these short tenn investments it would appear advisable that 
they should, for the present at least, be left with the Provident 
Fund .. 
The administration of the pools could be placed in the 
hands of trustees who were appointed by the authorities and 
possibly containing government representatives. 
Now to reiterate the advantages of th~ poQl system. 
Firstly it would alleviate the need for sinking funds and would 
enable the moneys that are at present invested in those funds 
to be released for other purposes. Secondly it W> uld provide an 
avenue of investment for the mounting reserves of the trading 
authorities, meaning that available finance from authorities 
with surpluses could be made available to other authorities. 
This would assist in providing a system of self finance for the 
local body sector and reduce the competition which this sector 
experiences from other quarters. Thirdly inter authority 
competition would be reduced as the pools could establish some 
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rational method of making finance available which would not be 
dependent upon the size or class of authority. Fourthly as the 
introduction of the loans pool system would mean little 
disruption of the market at the expense of the other sectors it 
could probably be implemented without much political opposition. 
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APPENDIX A 
SCHEDULE OF INTERVIEWS 
Some of the information contained in this thesis was 
obtained from a series of personal interviews conducted by 
the writer with those individuals who appeared to be in the 
best position to discuss the particular aspect of .the study 
under consideration. 
Interviews were conducted with the following. 
Secretary, New Zealand Harbours Association. 
Accountant, Wellington Hospital Board. 
Secretary, New Zealand Hospitals Association. 
An Officer of the State Advances Corporation of New Zealand. 
Assistant County Clerk, the Hutt County. 
Treasurer, Wellington Harbour Board. 
Investment Officer, Government Life Insurance Office. 
An Officer of the Local Authority Section of the Audit Department. 
A Borough Councillor of the Petone Borough. 
A Clerk of a Firm of Wellington Stockbrokers. 
Secretary, National Roads Board. 
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